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ARTICLES
PRIVATE DISORDERING?
PAYMENT CARD FRAUD LIABILITY RULES
Adam J. Levitin*
This Article argues that private ordering of fraud loss liability in
payment card systems is likely to be socially inefficient because it does not
reflect Coasean bargaining among payment card network participants.
Instead, loss allocation rules are the result of the most powerful party in the
system exercising its market power. Often loss liability is placed not on the
least cost avoider of fraud, but on the most price inelastic party, even if that
party has little or no ability to prevent or mitigate losses. Moreover, for
virtually identical payment systems, there is international variation in both
loss liability rules and security standards, suggesting that at least some
variations are suboptimal.
True Coasean bargaining is not possible in payment systems; the
transaction costs are too high because of the sheer number of participants.
Targeted coordination and competition, however, can achieve outcomes that
if not Coasean, are at least optimized relative to the current system. Thus,
the Article suggests a pair of complimentary regulatory responses. First,
regulators should develop a system for coordinating payment card security
measures with governance that adequately represents all parties involved in
payment card networks. And second, regulators should pursue more
vigorous antitrust enforcement of card networks’ restrictions on merchant
pricing to expose the costs of participating in a payment system—which
include fraud costs—to market discipline. The Article also presents an
extended defense of the major existing regulatory intervention in payment
card fraud loss allocation, the federal caps on consumer liability for
unauthorized payment card transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
Payment card fraud is a multi-billion dollar problem domestically and
globally. While there are no firm numbers on the actual cost of payment
fraud, one recent study estimates total costs of credit and debit card fraud in
the U.S. at approximately $109 billion in 2008.1 The losses from payment
card fraud are borne directly by merchants, a range of financial institutions,
1. See LEXISNEXIS, 2009 LEXISNEXIS TRUE COSTS OF FRAUD STUDY 6, 50, 54 (2009),
available at http://www.riskfinance.com/RFL/Merchant_Card_Fraud_files/LexisNexisTotalCost
Fraud_09.pdf [hereinafter LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY] (estimating total cost of all payment fraud
in the U.S. at $191.30 billion and that credit and debit fraud account for 57% of the total). These
figures should not be taken as precise statements because the study’s methodology was not always
clear and the figures did not include the costs sunk into fraud prevention by financial institutions
and merchants or the non-pecuniary costs of fraud, such as distortions in consumer purchasing and
payment patterns or time and hassle for consumers to straighten out credit reports and accounts.
See id. at 17. For a very different estimate of fraud costs, see Richard J. Sullivan, The Changing
Nature of U.S. Card Payment Fraud: Industry and Public Policy Options, FED. RESERVE BANK
OF KANSAS CITY ECON. REV., 2Q 2010, at 101, 112, available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/
Publicat/Econrev/pdf/10q2Sullivan.pdf (estimating $3.718 billion in credit and debit card fraud
losses in 2006 in the US). See also Kate Fitzgerald, An Industry At A Loss, PAYMENTSSOURCE,
May 2010, at 16, 17 (reporting bank card fraud expenses as $.95 billion for 2009 and $1.11 billion
for 2008).
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and consumers. Payment card fraud also creates deadweight loss for the
entire economy by increasing the cost of payments, the ultimate transaction
cost.2 Payment card fraud results in socialized losses because of the law
enforcement resources spent combating the problem and may also frustrate
some legitimate transactions that get caught by overly broad fraud
prevention methods.3
The allocation of these losses occurs through a combination of public
law and private ordering. Federal law generally limits individual consumer
liability for unauthorized credit and debit card transactions to $50.4 The
liability of merchants and financial institutions as well as business
cardholders5 is generally determined through private ordering.6
The loss allocation rules are important not only because of their
distributional consequences, but because of the incentives they create. The
greater a party’s liability for fraud losses, the greater incentive the party will
have to take care to avoid fraud. As payment card fraud has (apparently)
increased,7 it is worth asking whether the current loss allocation system is
the optimal one. Does it properly incentivize parties to take the optimal
level of care from a social welfare standpoint? Does the loss allocation
system facilitate or discourage commerce by limiting the transaction cost of
payment?

2. To the extent that merchants bear losses, payment fraud may get passed on to consumers in
the form of higher sale prices.
3. DELL INC., SUBMISSION OF DELL, INC. TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL
RESERVE REGARDING SECTION 920 OF THE ELECTRONIC FUNDS TRANSFER ACT (REDACTED
VERSION) 4, http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/dell_comment_letter_20101118.pdf
[hereinafter DELL LETTER].
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1643(a), 1693g(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1)(ii) (2010) (credit cards);
id. § 205.6(b) (debit cards). If the consumer does not provide the card issuer with timely notice
that the consumer’s card has been lost or stolen, the consumer’s liability can increase up to $500.
Id. See infra part IV for a more detailed discussion of consumer liability rules.
5. See 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (2006) (exempting “extensions of credit primarily for business,
commercial, or agricultural purposes, or to government or governmental agencies or
instrumentalities, or to organizations” from the credit transaction provisions of the Truth in
Lending Act); id. § 1693a (defining “account” for the purposes of the Electronic Fund Transfer
Act as being “established primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”). These
exemptions would cover even sole proprietors if the credit was extended or the account
established primarily for business purposes, as with a “business” card or “business” deposit
account.
6. An exception is state laws relating to data security breach notification. See Paul M.
Schwartz & Edward J. Janger, Notification of Data Security Breaches, 105 MICH. L. REV. 913,
924–25, 972–84 (2007).
7. LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY, supra note 1, at 26–27. Given the lack of solid payment card
fraud statistics in the United States, it is impossible to say with absolute certainty whether fraud
levels are increasing, much less relative to the size of the market. While issuers report fraud
losses, some of these losses are first-party fraud, where the consumer simply denies having carried
out the transaction that he or she made, while others are third-party fraud. Jasbir Anand, First
Party Fraud, SC MAGAZINE (Apr. 1, 2008), http://www.scmagazineus.com/first-partyfraud/article/108545.
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There is a sizeable literature on fraud and mistake liability allocation
rules in payments systems.8 This literature, however, generally focuses on
public law and on the propriety of liability allocation to consumers. There
has been little scholarly consideration of the private law that allocates
liability between merchants and financial institutions.9 The reason for this
comparative neglect is unclear. Until recently, payment card network
operating rules were not publicly available, which limited a critical primary
source for scholars. Moreover, scholars may have considered the allocation
of liability between merchants and financial institutions less of a policy
concern because the asymmetries in terms of information, sophistication,
and ability to exercise rights are less acute between merchants and financial
institutions than they are between consumers and financial institutions.
In perhaps the most extensive exposition on the issue, Professor
Richard Epstein and attorney Thomas Brown argue that the current system
of private loss allocation layered on top of a statutory baseline is flawed.10
Epstein and Brown argue that losses should be allocated solely through
private ordering. In their view, which they “would have thought beyond

8. See Mark E. Budnitz, Commentary: Technology as the Driver of Payment System Rules:
Will Consumers Be Provided Seatbelts and Air Bags?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 909 (2008); Robert
D. Cooter & Edward L. Rubin, A Theory of Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 63, 71–72 n.42 (1987) (reviewing pre-1970s writings on this topic); Francis J. Facciolo,
Unauthorized Payment Transactions and Who Should Bear the Losses, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605
(2008); Clayton P. Gillette, Rules, Standards, and Precautions in Payment Systems, 82 VA. L.
REV. 181 (1996); Clayton P. Gillette & Steven D. Walt, Uniformity and Diversity in Payment
Systems, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 499 (2008); Gail Hillebrand, Before the Grand Rethinking: Five
Things To Do Today with Payments Law and Ten Principles to Guide New Payments Products
and New Payments Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 769 (2008); Sarah Jane Hughes, Duty Issues in the
Ever-Changing World of Payments Processing: Is It Time for New Rules?, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
721 (2008); Ronald J. Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards in the United States and Japan, 55
VAND. L. REV. 1055 (2002) [hereinafter Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards]; Ronald J. Mann,
Making Sense of Payments Policy in the Information Age, 93 GEO. L.J. 633 (2005) [hereinafter
Mann, Making Sense of Payments]; James Steven Rogers, The Basic Principle of Loss Allocation
for Unauthorized Checks, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 453 (2004); Linda J. Rusch, Reimagining
Payment Systems: Allocation of Risk for Unauthorized Payment Inception, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
561 (2008).
9. I have identified only two works that focus on this issue in any detail. See Duncan B.
Douglass, An Examination of the Fraud Liability Shift in Consumer Card-Based Payment
Systems, FED. RES. BANK OF CHI. ECON. PERSP., 1Q 2009, at 43; Richard A. Epstein & Thomas P.
Brown, Cybersecurity in the Payment Card Industry, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (2008). Some other
works touch on payment card fraud liability rules, but do not consider them in detail, as they focus
on other types of payment systems. See Robert G. Ballen & Thomas A. Fox, The Role of Private
Sector Payment Rules and a Proposed Approach for Evaluating Future Changes to Payments
Law, 83 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937 (2008) (focusing on payment transaction rules among financial
institutions); Facciolo, supra note 8 (including a review of checks, ACH debits and wire transfers
along with credit and debit cards); Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards, supra note 8; Rusch,
supra note 8 (focusing on risk-allocation in unauthorized debits from deposit accounts).
10. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 209. Epstein and Brown approach payment systems
with a very strong set of anti-regulatory priors, or, as they refer to it, as their “classical liberal
perspective.” Id. at 203. Brown, an antitrust attorney, has previously worked in-house for Visa. Id.
at n. ††.
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reproach . . . voluntary contracts offer by far the best way to allocate the
risks of loss, and the duties of prevention, among the various parties within
this elaborate network.”11 Thus, Epstein and Brown “see no reason even for
th[e] (modest) restriction on freedom of contract [created by the federal
limitation on consumer liability for unauthorized transactions]. If payment
card companies think larger penalties are appropriate and disclose such
penalties to consumers, the losses should not be socialized as a matter of
law.”12 For Epstein and Brown, all liability for unauthorized transactions
should be allocated contractually; mandatory (or even default) statutory
rules are inappropriate in their view.13
This Article argues that we should be skeptical of the efficiency of
private ordering in payment card markets. In a world with a complete set of
perfectly competitive markets, private ordering is surely the right
outcome—Coasean bargaining would ensure that fraud losses would be
allocated to the least cost avoider and the optimal level of care would ensue.
But there is never a complete set of perfectly competitive markets except in
economists’ models and dogmatic fantasies,14 and Coase’s great lesson is
that transaction costs matter; in their presence, the initial allocation of
liability is critical.15
Payment card markets are always incomplete, as there are no futures or
insurance markets in most areas of payments through which risks can be
hedged.16 If one commits to using a payment system, thereby incurring
fraud risk, one cannot also short payment fraud futures as a hedge, much
less the futures on a particular card or transaction. At best, one could short a
payment card network, but that is an imperfect proxy for fraud risk, as the
costs to a network from elevated fraud are limited, and is hardly negatively
correlated with fraudulent activity on a particular card-linked account.17
Payment card markets are also imperfect because of limited information.
For example, it is often impossible to determine how a fraud was
perpetrated and therefore who would have been the least cost avoider.
Epstein and Brown assume something close to a perfect market in
payment systems, noting the “high level of competition that exists
everywhere in the credit card industry.”18 Market realities are quite
11. Id. at 209.
12. Id. at 219.
13. See id. at 209, 219, 223. It is unclear whether Epstein and Brown would envisage payment
card companies actually bargaining with individual consumers or whether they would simply
present consumers with contracts of adhesion in which fraud loss rules were one of many nonnegotiable components of a package offer.
14. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, WHITHER SOCIALISM? 27–44 (1994) (presenting a critique of the
first fundamental theorem of welfare economics).
15. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 14–15 (1960).
16. See generally Mark D. Flood, An Introduction to Complete Markets, FED. RES. BANK OF
ST. LOUIS REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 32 (explaining incomplete markets, futures, and hedged risks).
17. See generally LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY, supra note 1.
18. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 203.
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different.19 Some parts of payment cards markets are intensely competitive,
while others are not.20 Payment card networks—MasterCard, Visa, Amex,
Discover, and around a dozen relatively small personal-identificationnumber (PIN)-debit networks—are two-sided networks.21 Network effects,
combined with the need to roll out payment networks nationally, at the very
least, create high barriers to entry for new networks.22 Further, while there
are numerous card issuers and acquirers, the market is heavily concentrated
in a handful of institutions. The five (ten) largest card issuers account for
74% (90%) of the credit card market and 43% (51%) of the debit card
market in terms of purchase volume.23 More critically, the mere fact that
there are numerous competitors does not mean that there is competition
along every axis of the market. For example, competition may exist for
market share or for price, but not for security.
Payment card systems also involve a variety of participants with
divergent incentives. This creates intense coordination problems. The
networks lead the coordination efforts, but they are driven by their own
incentives, primarily to increase the size of the network.24 As long as fraud
remains sufficiently low that it does not damage the network’s reputation,
the network’s primary concern is maximizing total transaction volume,
irrespective of whether the transactions are fraudulent.25 Increasing the size
of the network is a function of calibrating the network’s cost allocation
(including fraud) to fully leverage network participants’ price elasticity.26
Fraud liability is a cost of using a payment system and is therefore a
type of pricing affected by the level of competition in the market.
Therefore, more price inelastic participants (those whose demand for a
payment system’s services is the least sensitive to price changes) might bear
a larger share of fraud losses, regardless of whether they are the least cost
avoiders of the fraud. By allocating fraud losses to the most price inelastic
19. See Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints,
55 UCLA L. REV. 1321, 1356–63 (2008) [hereinafter Levitin, Economic Costs].
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1387.
22. Id. at 1386–87; see also JOHN M. GALLAUGHER, INFORMATION SYSTEMS: A MANAGER’S
GUIDE TO HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY (2010), available at http://www.flatworldknowledge.com/
pub/1.0/information-systems-manager%E2%80%99s-/206326#web-206326.
23. See THE NILSON REP. ISSUE 919 (Feb. 2009); THE NILSON REP. ISSUE 918 (Jan. 2009);
THE NILSON REP. ISSUE 917 (Jan. 2009); Adam J. Levitin, Interchange Regulation: Implications
for Credit Unions, FILENE RESEARCH INST., Nov. 24, 2010, at 1, 39,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/levitin_filene_paper.pdf.
24. See generally Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1356–59, 1364–65, 1398
(detailing ways that networks coordinate their systems to raise revenue and discussing the
negative network effect of negative externality).
25. See generally David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV.
L. REV. 373, 393 (1990) (discussing the nonlegal sanction of loss of reputation among market
participants); Schwartz & Janger, supra note 6, at 929–32 (discussing the cost and associated
pressures of reputational sanctions).
26. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1364–66.
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party, the number of network participants is maximized, but deadweight
loss may occur if the most price inelastic network participant is not also the
least cost avoider of fraud.
Previous work on payment systems has viewed fraud liability rules as
unconnected with competition issues.27 Thus, in their groundbreaking paper
on the economics of payment system loss allocation rules, written well
before the emergence of major payment card antitrust litigation, Professors
Robert D. Cooter and Edward L. Rubin noted that “[t]he structure of the
financial services industry may cause market failures, such as oligopolistic
or monopolistic behavior, but these tend to affect pricing rather than loss
allocation.”28 Ironically, though, one of the sources Cooter and Rubin cited
for this was the seminal paper on credit card interchange fee competition.29
While Cooter and Rubin viewed loss allocation as a distinct issue from
pricing, a major point of this Article is that loss allocation is itself a type of
pricing and cannot be viewed as unaffected by antitrust matters.
This Article argues that the rules for allocating payment card fraud loss
are likely to be suboptimal because they are shaped by discrepancies in
market participants’ bargaining power. In payment card networks there is
not unfettered bargaining over fraud loss allocation. Instead of Coasean
bargaining, there is merely fiat ordering by the most powerful party in the
network—the network association itself—which is interested in maximizing
total transaction volume, rather than total nonfraudulent transaction
volume.30 In such circumstances, we should be skeptical that private
ordering achieves socially efficient outcomes. Instead, in a market replete
with competition and information problems, private disordering may obtain,
and, with it, negative social externalities.
To this end, the Article reviews payment card network fraud liability
allocation rules, focusing on Visa and MasterCard, the two largest payment
card issuers that, combined, accounted for 84% of the total U.S. payment
card (debit, credit, and prepaid) market in purchase transaction volume in
2008.31 It shows that liability allocations among card network participants
are likely inefficient as they often place liability on parties with little or no
ability to prevent fraud.32 The Article also notes international variation in
liability rules and security measures, and the fraud arbitrage problems that
stem from these variations. International inconsistency in liability rules and
27. Professor Ronald Mann has recognized this point implicitly in his comparative study of
credit cards in the United States and Japan. See Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards, supra note
8, at 1088–99 (discussing impact of fraud rates on merchant fees).
28. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 8, at 68 n.30.
29. See id. (citing William Baxter, Bank Interchange of Transactional Paper: Legal and
Economic Perspectives, 26 J.L. & ECON. 541, 554–55, 586–88 (1983)).
30. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1334–38.
31. THE NILSON REP. ISSUE 924, at 8 (Apr. 2009) (comparing 2008 “Totals” for Visa and
Mastercard “Credit” and “Debit & Prepaid” categories against 2008 “Credit & Debit Totals”).
32. See Douglass, supra note 9, at 46–47.
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security measures for the same companies in virtually identical markets
suggests that private ordering may not be producing optimal results
globally.33
While private ordering may not produce optimal results, regulatory
intervention poses its own problems. Regulators are subject to their own
idiosyncratic concerns and pressures, and they also lack perfect
information.34 Yet, if regulatory intervention cannot achieve optimal
outcomes, it might still help optimize market outcomes. Thoughtful
regulatory intervention can compensate for some of the bargaining power
disparities and help achieve an outcome that is closer to that which would
obtain in a complete, perfectly competitive market.
Accordingly, this Article argues for two complimentary regulatory
interventions. First, broader-based payment card security measure
coordination should be encouraged. The current coordination mechanism
for payment card security—the Payment Card Industry Security Standards
Council—features a governance structure that does not adequately represent
all interests in payment card networks or provide them with due process. As
a result, the Council is perceived as being an instrumentality for the card
networks to reinforce the placement of liability on the most price inelastic
type of network participant, rather than engaging in effective reforms. To
this end, it might be necessary for payment card security coordination to be
conducted under a federal aegis.35
Second, card networks should be encouraged to compete more
vigorously for merchants, be this through legislation or rulemaking or
through antitrust enforcement of payment card network rules pertaining to
merchant pricing.36 Fraud costs are part of pricing.37 While the huge
transaction costs in coordinating multiple parties in payment card networks
defeats true Coasean bargaining, better price competition among networks
for merchants will help achieve a result closer to the Coasean ideal.
The Article also presents a defense of the federal limitation on
consumer liability.38 The federal limitation creates a moral hazard and
constrains the range of potential bargaining.39 It is tempered, however,
33. See infra pp. 22–30.
34. Once we accept that the market is flawed, however, there is no inherent reason to favor
market solutions over regulatory ones. Both systems might produce suboptimal outcomes, and we
have no way of ascertaining which system is more likely to do so or whether an outcome is in fact
optimal. In such circumstances, there is no good reason to fall back on anti-regulatory priors.
Instead, when efficiency proves an indeterminate metric, it must be jettisoned for a metric, such as
political accountability.
35. See infra pp. 30–32.
36. See infra pp. 32–36.
37. See Gillete & Walt, supra note 8, at 500; Adam J. Levitin, The Antitrust Super Bowl:
America’s Payment Systems, No-Surcharge Rules, and the Hidden Costs of Credit, 3 BERK. BUS.
L.J. 265, 273–74 (2005).
38. See infra Part IV.
39. Douglass, supra note 9, at 46.
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through monetary and nonmonetary deductibles and copayments and
reflects a reasonable response to an adverse selection problem and to the
enormous informational and bargaining cost asymmetries between
consumers and card issuers regarding fraud risk, as well as to consumers’
limited ability to prevent most third-party fraud and limited ability to bear
losses relative to other payment card network participants.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an overview of the
structure of payment card networks and their loss allocation rules in the
United States. Part II questions whether the liability rules do in fact result in
a Kaldor-Hicks efficient outcome. Part III considers possible and existing
regulatory interventions to level the playing field and move payment card
networks closer to Coasean bargaining outcomes. Part IV examines the
consumer loss liability rules and presents a defense of the federal
limitations on consumer liability of unauthorized transactions.
An important introductory note: this Article focuses solely on the issue
of allocation of losses for unauthorized transactions. It does not generally
address the related issues of liability for compromised payment data storage
or data transmission that results in fraud losses for others. Data security
breaches have become a major issue in payment card security in recent
years. Whether there should be some form of tort liability for data security
breaches, whether liability should be set by private ordering, what the
liability standard should be, and whether compliance with industry
standards such as Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard would be
sufficient to relieve liability are important questions.40
Ultimately, however, flaws in data storage or data transmission only
matter to the extent that unauthorized transactions can occur. The data have
no inherent value; the data’s attraction to fraudsters derives solely from
their ability to capitalize on it, and using it for fraudulent transactions is the
most immediate way to do so.41 Thus, data breach liability is better
conceived as liability for potential fraud and the steps that must be taken to
reduce the likelihood that the breach will translate into fraud, such as
reissuance of cards with new numbers following a breach. It is also often
difficult to trace the unauthorized use of a card to a particular data security
breach, which makes the liability relationship more tenuous.42 To be sure,
there are improvements that can and should be made in data storage and
transmission—tokenization and end-to-end encryption should both be
pursued vigorously.43 But those improvements will not eliminate fraud
40. Cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (Hand, J.) (suggesting that industry
standard is not necessarily the proper standard of diligence as “a whole calling may have unduly
lagged in the adoption of new and available devices”).
41. Not all data breach issues even relate to payments, although payment data is the most
readily monetizable type of data.
42. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 108, 110.
43. Tokenization is a data fortification strategy. It is meant to address the problem of data
residing in relatively vulnerable locations, such as with retailers. Tokenization means that data
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problems. Better data protection will make it harder to get the data
necessary to commit certain types of fraud, but the critical line of fraud
defense for all third-party fraud is transaction authorization.
I. PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS AND LIABILITY RULES
A. STRUCTURE OF PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS
Payment card transactions all involve multi-party networks of financial
institutions, consumers, and merchants. Transmission of a payment from a
consumer to a merchant to pay for goods or services is conducted through at
least three financial institutions: the consumer’s bank (the issuer bank), the
merchant’s bank (the acquirer bank), and the card network association
(MasterCard, Visa, Amex, Discover, or PIN debit network) that
intermediates between the banks and sets the rules governing their
transactions. Thus, a payment card transaction involves at least five parties,
although in the case of American Express and Discover,44 the card network
is often also the card issuer and the acquirer. (See Figure 1).
Figure 1. Payment Card Network Structure

Often a payment card transaction involves additional parties. Acquirers
frequently outsource all but the financing element of their operations. The
task of recruiting merchant customers for the acquirer is often outsourced to
an independent sales organization (ISO), and all the technical linkages
between the merchant and the card network association are often outsourced

resides in harder-to-hack “fortified” locations; merchants would only retain a “token” number that
links to the data stored off-site. Instead of residing with merchants, who do not specialize in data
security, tokenization moves the data to companies with expertise and reputational capital (and
potentially insurance policies) that guarantee data protection. End-to-end encryption means that
card data is never transmitted in an unencrypted form.
44. Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1328.

2010]

Private Disordering?

11

to a separate data processor.45 For Internet transactions a separate gateway
provider might also be involved.46
In a payment card transaction, the consumer must first transfer
information about the consumer’s account (either funded or a line of credit)
to the merchant, or more precisely, to the merchant’s acquirer or data
processor. This can be done in several ways. The information can be
transferred electronically via a magnetic swipe. The information can be
transferred electronically via radio-frequency identity (RFID) chip
(“contactless”). The information can be transferred physically via an
impression made by an imprinter (a “knucklebuster”). The information can
be transferred orally and recorded by hand. The information can be
transferred in a written form, as occurs in mail-order transactions. Or the
information can be transferred electronically via a Web site. Some
transactions require additional information (such as a PIN number or a ZIP
code) to be conveyed via a PIN pad.
Once this information is conveyed to the merchant, it is then relayed to
the credit card network by the merchant’s processor for authorization,
capture, and settlement (ACS).47 Authorization involves the card network
first verifying that the card is real and then the issuer approving the
transaction. Once a transaction has been authorized, it may then be
captured.
Capture involves the transfer of funds from the issuer bank to the
acquirer bank. The transfer is done between the institutions’ accounts at the
card network association, which serves as a clearinghouse for the
payments.48 The issuer transfers to the acquirer the amount of the
transaction minus a fee, known as the interchange fee.49 The interchange fee
is set by the network and varies by the type and size of the merchant, the
type of card (consumer or commercial, credit or debit), and the level of
rewards on the card.50 The card network also takes out various fees to cover
its costs of processing the transaction plus its profit margin.51 Thus, the
network debits the issuer’s account for the amount of the transaction less
45. See Ramon P. DeGennaro, Merchant Acquirers and Payment Card Processors: A Look
Inside the Black Box, FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV., 1Q 2006, at 27, 31.
46. Adam J. Levitin, Priceless? The Social Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 45
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 5 n. 13 (2008) [hereinafter Levitin, Social Costs].
47. Sometimes the merchant never actually has control over the data, which instead goes
straight to the processor.
48. DeGennaro, supra note 45, at 33.
49. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-558, CREDIT AND DEBIT CARDS:
FEDERAL ENTITIES ARE TAKING ACTIONS TO LIMIT THEIR INTERCHANGE FEES, BUT
ADDITIONAL REVENUE COLLECTION COST SAVINGS MAY EXIST 1 (2008).
50. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1333.
51. Historically, MasterCard and Visa were mutual organizations owned by their member
institutions. Accordingly, they only charged a “switch” fee to cover their costs of processing
transactions. Since becoming publicly-traded stock companies, however, MasterCard and Visa
have needed to operate on a for-profit basis and have added additional fees.
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the interchange fee and credits the acquirer bank’s account for the
transaction amount minus both interchange and network fees.
Finally, the transaction is settled, meaning that the acquirer credits the
merchant’s account with the funds representing the transaction amount
minus its own fee, called the merchant discount fee. The merchant discount
fee is set to cover the interchange fee and network fees paid by the acquirer,
as well as the acquirers’ other costs and a profit margin. Frequently the
merchant discount fee is explicitly priced as “interchange plus”—as a
spread over the applicable interchange and network fees—making
interchange and network fees functionally pass-thru fees to the merchant.52
When a transaction is reversed (referred to as a “chargeback”), the
system works backwards.53 The acquirer transfers funds from the
merchant’s account to its account and then to the network. These funds are
captured in the issuer’s account. The issuer then settles the funds back in
the consumer’s account. Chargebacks generally involve their own set of
additional fees from the network to the acquirer and thence from the
acquirer to the merchant.54 The interchange and network fees on the original
transaction are not always refunded to the merchant when there is a
chargeback.55
Payment card networks are “two-sided networks,”56 meaning that they
have two distinct types of end customers: merchants and consumers.
Payment card networks are unique among two-sided networks, however, in
that they have not only two different types of end customers, but also two
different types of intermediate customers: acquirers and issuers. The
existence of these four different types of customers significantly
complicates the economic workings of payment card networks.
In a two-sided network, the value of participating in the network to one
type of customer depends on how many of the other type of customer are
participating. For example, heterosexual bars and newspaper classifieds are
both examples of two-sided networks. At heterosexual bars, the appeal of
52. Interchange Reimbursement Fees, MERCHANT COUNCIL, http://www.merchantcouncil.org/
merchant-account-information/rates-fees.php (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). A “blended rate” that
gives merchants a single merchant discount rate, regardless of the particular mix of interchange
rates on the cards used, is a common alternative, especially for smaller merchants. Id. (Enhanced
Recover Reducer (ERR)).
53. Chargebacks & Dispute Resolution: Chargeback Cycle, VISA, http://usa.visa.com/mercha
nts/operations/chargebacks_dispute_resolution/chargeback_cycle.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
54. Merchant Card Processing: Frequently Asked Questions, BANK OF AMERICA,
http://www.bankofamerica.com/small_business/merchant_card_processing/index.cfm?template=f
aqs#cb_2 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
55. See generally MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, CHARGEBACK GUIDE (Apr. 16, 2010)
[hereinafter MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE].
56. But see Dennis W. Carlton & Alan S. Frankel, Transaction Costs, Externalities, and “TwoSided” Payment Markets, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 617, 626–31 (arguing that the concept of
two-sided markets is insufficiently defined and that most markets can be described as two-sided
because consumers benefit from the supply created in response to the demand of other
consumers).
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the bar to men depends on the number of women present and vice-versa.
Straight men do not want to go to bars populated only by other straight
men, and straight women do not want to go to bars populated only by other
straight women. Likewise, newspaper classifieds are of interest to
advertisers based on the number of readers and to readers based on the
number of advertisers. Advertisers want classified readers and classified
readers want advertisers. Similarly, the value of being a cardholder in a
payment card network depends on the number of merchants in the network
and vice-versa.
In card networks, as with other two-sided networks, the increase in
marginal value from greater network participation diminishes as the
network grows. It is of little consequence to a consumer if a card network
has 50 million or 50 million and one merchants in the network. Once a
network is sufficiently well established, its marginal size is of limited
importance to its value to its participants.
A multi-bank payment card network like MasterCard or Visa (and
American Express and Discover for their third-party issuers) has a more
delicate balancing act to maintain than simply achieving a balance between
the two types of end-users, consumers and merchants. Multi-bank networks
also have to ensure participation of a sufficient number of both issuers and
acquirers in order to ultimately optimize and grow end-user participation.57
The existence of both intermediate customers and end-customers for
payment card networks further complicates the dependency. The value of a
network to the intermediate customers—issuers and acquirers—depends not
on the number of the other type of intermediate customer, but on the
number of the other type of intermediate customer’s end-customer.
Acquirers care about the number of cardholders in the network, and issuers
care about the number of merchants.58 This is not the case for the endcustomers. It is irrelevant to consumers and merchants how many
intermediate customers (issuers and acquirers) are in the network;59 instead,
network value depends on the numerosity (and geographic and industry
concentration) of the other type of end-customer.60
Price elasticities—willingness to pay—for network services are likely
to differ between customer types in a two-sided network. Because the value
of the network to its participants depends on increasing the size of both
sides of the network, pricing of access to the network involves allocating
network costs to the different types of participants according to their price
elasticity in order to maximize the size, and hence value, of the network.61
57. See id. at 631–37.
58. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1377.
59. Consumers care about the number of issuers of cards in general, but for reasons related to
competition for card provision, rather than network dynamics.
60. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1364–65.
61. Id.
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A central role of the network association is to coordinate optimal
participation in the network through price manipulation, both in terms of
direct monetary pricing and indirect pricing through network rules that
impose liability on network participants for losses or limit network
participants’ ability to reallocate costs to other network participants.62
For merchants, these costs are the merchant discount fee, any sunk
equipment fees, and fees to ISOs and processors, as well as the costs of
fraud. For consumers using a credit card, these costs are an annual fee (if
any), the costs of revolving a balance, ancillary fees (over-limit, late, cash
advance, foreign transaction, e.g.), and the costs of fraud.63 For consumers
using a debit card, the costs are account maintenance fees (if any), overdraft
fees (if any), and the costs of fraud. For merchants and consumers, fraud
costs are part of the total cost of participating in a payment card network.
Fraud liability is a price component, just not one that is explicitly priced.
Payment card network associations do not have contractual privity with
the end-users of the networks.64 Accordingly, they do not have direct
control over the total price for the end-users. They may exercise this control
only indirectly through their pricing and rules for issuers and acquirers.
These prices and rules set a floor for the pricing and rules that issuers and
acquirers apply to their respective end-users, consumers, and merchants.
While the payment card networks’ rules technically bind only the card
networks’ member institutions—issuer and acquirer banks—the costs are
passed on to the end-users to the extent permitted by law (and card
association rules).65
B. PAYMENT CARD LIABILITY RULES IN THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the liability for unauthorized payment card
transactions is allocated partially by statute and partially by private
ordering. Federal law generally limits individual consumer liability for
unauthorized transactions to $50 for credit and debit cards, albeit with
important exceptions discussed in Part IV, infra.66 The liability of
merchants and financial institutions is determined through private ordering
under payment card network rules. The payment card networks’ rules
technically bind only the card networks’ member institutions—issuer and
acquirer banks. Acquirers, however, uniformly pass on their liability to their
merchants by contract, sometimes adding fees.

62. Id. at 1334–38 (describing network rules that restrict merchants’ ability to reallocate costs
to consumers).
63. Consumers bear the cost of interchange indirectly in the form of higher prices or reduced
merchant services. See Levitin, Social Costs, supra note 46, at 27–37.
64. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1327–31.
65. See id. at 1334–39.
66. See supra note 4.
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All payment card networks have substantially identical rules,67 although
there is variation in the often inscrutable details. In certain circumstances,
the issuer is allowed to chargeback the transaction to the acquirer, thereby
putting loss liability on the acquirer.68 The card networks’ rules governing
chargebacks are extremely complicated and run hundreds of pages long, but
they can largely be summarized as follows: for card-present transactions,
where the merchant can physically examine the card and obtain a signature
or PIN code, the issuer bears all liability for unauthorized transactions,
provided that the merchant followed the required security steps. These steps
generally involve inspection of the card, obtaining authorization from the
issuer for the transaction, and obtaining a signature from the cardholder.69
Signatures, as we shall see, are not authorization devices, but ex post loss
allocation devices. Card-present transactions include any transaction in
which the card is physically swiped at a magnetic stripe (mag stripe) reader
in the presence of the merchant’s employee, and is imprinted on a
“knucklebuster” or otherwise physically handled by the merchant. Some
networks also include small ticket (“No Signature Required”) transactions
and contactless or “proximity” RFID transactions in this category.70 For
card-not-present (CNP) transactions, such as mail-order and telephoneorder (MOTO) or Internet transactions, the acquirer (and hence the
merchant) bears all liability for unauthorized transactions.71

67. See MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, MASTERCARD RULES (May 12, 2010) [hereinafter
MASTERCARD RULES]; VISA, INT’L OPERATING REGULATIONS (Apr. 1, 2010) [hereinafter VISA
INT’L REGULATIONS]; AMERICAN EXPRESS, MERCH. REGULATIONS—U.S. (Apr. 2010);
DISCOVER, MERCHANT OPERATING REGULATIONS, RELEASE 10.2 (Apr. 16, 2010) [hereinafter
DISCOVER MERCHANT OPERATING REGULATIONS].
68. See, e.g., VISA, INT’L OPERATING REGULATIONS—DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 20
(Nov. 2, 2009), available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/visa-international-operatingregulations-dispute-resolution-rules.pdf [hereinafter VISA DISPUTE PROCEDURES].
69. Id. at 100–02. Gas station pump transactions, which require a physical card to be swiped,
do not qualify as “card-present” because there is no physical examination of the card by a station
employee.
70. See id. at 102–03; AMERICAN EXPRESS, MERCH. REGULATIONS—U.S. (Oct. 2009) §
4.6.2., at 31. The shifting of fraud liability from merchants to issuers for these types of
transactions is to foster merchant acceptance of contactless and signature-free transactions, which
issuers might anticipate resulting in larger ticket transactions because of the seamlessness of the
spending process.
71. VISA DISPUTE PROCEDURES, supra note 68, at 112–13. There are some important
exceptions to this rule. For example Visa puts the loss on the issuer if the merchant shipped
merchandise and the issuer did not participate in its Address Verification Service. Id. at 114–15.
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II. WHAT HATH PRIVATE ORDERING WROUGHT?
A. WHO IS THE LEAST COST AVOIDER? CARD-PRESENT
TRANSACTIONS
In a world of perfect markets, liability for a harm is optimally allocated
to the least cost avoider of that harm.72 The fact that payment cards are twosided networks is irrelevant to the application of the least cost avoider
principle; allocating the loss to the least cost avoider is the efficient
outcome, regardless of varying price elasticities between merchants and
card issuers. This can be seen from considering how the total value of a
payment system to its participants varies with fraud loss allocation. The
total value (V) of a payment system to its participants is equal to their
collective net benefit from the system excluding fraud costs (E) minus fraud
costs (F). Thus, V=E-F. We can refine this as V=EMerchant+EBank-FMerchantFBank.
The values of FMerchant and FBank depend on which party is liable for
fraud. If a party is not liable, then its fraud costs are zero. For simplicity’s
sake, assume that fraud costs can either be allocated wholly to the merchant
or wholly to the issuer bank, but not shared. Therefore, if the costs are
allocated wholly to the merchant, FBank= 0, and if the costs are allocated
wholly to the card issuer, then FMerchant=0.
Thus, the value maximizing proposition depends on whether
EMerchant+EBank-FMerchant >?< EMerchant+EBank-FBank, which means it depends on
whether the issuer bank and the merchant are liable, FBank>?<FMerchant. The
relative values of FBank and FMerchant depend on how cheaply each party can
avoid fraud, as F, the total costs of fraud, is the sum of fraud losses plus
fraud avoidance expenses. If the merchant can avoid fraud more cheaply
then the issuer bank, then FBank>FMerchant, and V will be maximized by
placing liability on the merchant, whereas if the issuer bank can avoid fraud
more cheaply, then FBank<FMerchant, and V will be maximized by placing
liability on the issuer bank.
The key point to see here is that E is irrelevant to the outcome. E is the
net benefit that the network’s participants derive from participating
(excluding fraud costs). The participants’ maximum willingness to pay in
the absence of fraud costs—the limit to their price elasticity—must equal E,
as they will not pay beyond the net benefit received. This means that the
network participants’ price elasticity is irrelevant for the application of the
least cost avoider principle. Even in a two-sided network, then, the least
cost avoider principle is unaltered.

72. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 136–38 (1970) (exploring the least cost avoider in a typical car and pedestrian
accident).
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So, are fraud losses in payment card networks allocated to the least cost
avoider? Are the card networks’ fraud loss allocation rules efficient?
For card-present transactions, the rules place the loss on the issuer,
unless the merchant has failed to follow some basic steps in inspecting the
card and obtaining a signature or PIN (with exceptions for proximity and
no-signature small ticket transactions).73 Consider how this allocation
applies in the five basic card-present fraud situations:74
1.

The “friendly fraud” or “first-party fraud” scenario, when a real
cardholder uses his or her card to obtain goods or services and then
denies having authorized the transaction or otherwise claims that the
transaction was defective (by claiming nondelivery of goods or
nonconforming merchandise, e.g.).

2.

The “stolen card” scenario, when a card is stolen and used by the thief
(or a taker from the thief) to perform a transaction. The card is a real
card being used by an unauthorized user.

3.

The “fraudulent issuance” scenario, when a transaction is performed
on a real card that was issued based on fraudulent information
(typically to a fictitious individual). The card is a real card being used
by an authorized (but fake) user.

4.

The “real account, counterfeit card” scenario, where the transaction is
performed using a counterfeit card that uses real data copied from an
actual card. The card is a fake card, but the user is an authorized user.

5.

The “fake account, counterfeit card” scenario, where a transaction is
performed using a counterfeit card that uses generated data that does
not match any actual account (but often partially matches with
fraudster). This is a fake card with an unauthorized user.

For situation one, the “friendly fraud” or “first-party fraud” scenario,
the least cost avoider is the consumer. If it can be shown that the consumer
did in fact perform the transaction, the consumer will bear the liability
(assuming the consumer can be found and is solvent). In this scenario, there
is no particular care that either the merchant or the issuer can take to avoid
the fraud ex-ante. The transaction is indistinguishable from a legitimate
purchase until the cardholder denies having made the transaction. At that
point, the question is whether there is sufficient proof that the transaction
was in fact properly authorized. Proof of authorization depends on the
authorization method. If the merchant follows authorization protocols, then
the issuer is the least cost avoider, as the issuer controls the authorization
procedures. Accordingly, if the first-party fraud cannot be proven, the issuer

73. VISA DISPUTE PROCEDURES, supra note 68, at 100–07.
74. This Article does not address the various merchant-initiated fraud situations that can arise,
including factoring for money laundering purposes.
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bears the liability in the card-present environment. This means that liability
rests on the least cost avoider.
For situation two, the “stolen card” scenario, if the consumer received
the card, then the consumer is likely the least cost avoider, at least until the
point that the card’s theft is reported, at which point the issuer is the least
cost avoider as the issuer can simply deactivate the card and deny any
authorization requests.75 Likewise, if the consumer did not receive the card
because it was intercepted by a fraudster, then the issuer would be the least
cost avoider as the issuer controls the card activation procedures.
The merchant is unlikely to be the least cost avoider for a stolen or
intercepted card. The merchant might be able to recognize a card as stolen
based on an obvious mismatch of the user and the name on the card—such
as if Dolly Parton used Barack Obama’s credit card—but card network
rules do not expect merchants to catch obvious mismatches, and the
merchant may generally not demand identification as a condition of
accepting the card.76
Card network rules do generally require merchants to compare the
signature on the charge slip with the specimen signature on the card,77 but
signature matching is an art, not a science, at least when practiced by store
clerks, and is of little use in preventing fraud. The signature of a harried
consumer, such as one in a grocery line attempting to soothe a bevy of
bawling toddlers, is likely to vary significantly from a calmly written
specimen. In a typical commercial context, the store clerk never examines
the card in any way, not least because it is not an efficient use of the clerk’s
time. Even if a merchant’s employees were diligent in examining
signatures, the fraud reduction savings would likely be minimal. These
savings would also be unlikely to offset the costs to the merchant from
slower transaction speed at the register, namely the loss of sales because of
greater transaction costs for customers due to increased wait times at the
register or the cost of hiring more employees to work at the register. As

75. The major exception is the small minority of U.S. card transactions that are not authorized
in real time (e.g., knucklebuster or telephone transactions). In those cases, the merchant may have
parted with the merchandise before obtaining an authorization. When a merchant delivers without
having obtained prior authorization, then the merchant is the least cost avoider.
76. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 5.8.4, at 5-17; VISA INT’L REGULATIONS, supra
note 67, at 468 (only requiring merchant review of additional identification where the signature
panel is blank). The merchant may also require the cardholder’s address or ZIP code for certain
transactions. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67; VISA INT’L REGULATIONS, supra note 67, at
469. Discover requires merchants to examine two pieces of identification, one of which must be
government issued for authorizing transactions on unsigned cards, but its rules are silent regarding
examination of extrinsic identification for signed cards. See DISCOVER MERCHANT OPERATING
REGULATIONS, supra note 67, § 3.1.2.1.
77. See, e.g., MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 55, §§ 2.1.6.3.1–3.2; VISA INT’L
REGULATIONS, supra note 67, at 463–64; DISCOVER MERCHANT OPERATING REGULATIONS,
supra note 67, §§ 3.1.2–3.1.2.1.
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with situation one, the ultimate least cost avoider in a stolen/lost card
scenario is the issuer, and that is where liability rests.
In situation three, involving a fraudulently issued card, the issuer is the
least cost avoider. There is no real consumer, and the merchant has even
less ability to detect the fraud than with a stolen card, as the card
information, including the signature, can be tailored to match that of the
fraudster using the card. Again, the least cost avoider is liable.
In situation four, “real account, counterfeit card,” it is not clear who is
the least cost avoider. As the counterfeit card is made using real consumer
data, data protection is the critical issue for preventing this type of fraud.
The least cost avoider for data protection varies as data flows through the
transaction process and is also retained for various purposes. But even with
optimal data protection, there is still the possibility of “skimming”—the
recording of card data from a magnetic stripe when the card is tendered to a
merchant’s employee (a particular problem in restaurants).78 The skimmed
data is then encoded onto a counterfeit card (or used in card-not-present
transactions).
Thus for “real account, counterfeit card” the least cost avoider largely
depends on how the fraudster obtained the real account information.
Depending on how the information was obtained, the consumer, issuer,
merchant or acquirer/processor could be at fault. Once the information is in
circulation, however, the ability to prevent the counterfeiting largely
depends on the issuer and the network and the security features they require
for physical cards. The merchant is unlikely to detect the counterfeit. The
merchant has no particular skill or ability to detect a counterfeit card
beyond a blatantly poor forgery. This means the merchant has virtually no
ability to stop the fraud. As the issuer controls the physical design of the
card, and hence the ease of counterfeiting, the issuer is the least cost
avoider, and yet again, the issuer is liable.
In situation five, with a counterfeit card using fake account information,
the least cost avoider is likely the issuer. In this situation there is no actual
consumer, and the merchant has little ability to detect the forgery. While the
network and issuer have control over the physical characteristics of the
card, which affect ease of counterfeiting, the issuer must authorize the
transaction, and if the card does not match an existing account number, the
issuer can easily deny the transaction. As with the other card-present
scenarios, the issuer is the least cost avoider and is liable.
For card-present transactions, the least cost avoider may vary somewhat
situationally, but it is typically the issuer. It makes sense to require the
merchant to take basic anti-fraud steps and, if followed, place the loss on
the issuer, who is then the least cost avoider. This is exactly what card

78. See Facciolo, supra note 8, at 629.
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network rules mandate. Thus, the current arrangement of loss allocation for
card-present rules seems largely sensible.
B. WHO IS THE LEAST COST AVOIDER? CARD-NOT-PRESENT
TRANSACTIONS
Card-not-present transactions present a different story. CNP liability
rules are a product of the historical development of payment card markets.
When card networks first began, there were no CNP transactions. All
transactions required physical presentment of the card, and the issuer bore
the risk of unauthorized transactions (as explained above) as merchants
were unwilling to assume fraud risk for a nascent technology over which
they had little control.79
Merchants, however, wanted to be able to take cards for mail-order and
telephone-order (MOTO) transactions, where no card would be presented
physically.80 Issuers were reluctant to assume fraud risk for these
transactions, even if the expiry date was used as a password and
merchandise was required to be sent to the cardholder’s billing address.81
Merchants concluded that the gains from these transactions outweighed the
fraud risks, so they agreed to assume liability for unauthorized MOTO
transactions82 (certainly it was no riskier for them than shipping before a
check was received and cleared).
The fraud liability rules made sense in their historical origins. Today,
however, they are less sensible, as most CNP transactions are not MOTO,
but Internet transactions. Historically, card fraud involved situations one
through four (friendly fraud, stolen card, fraudulent issuance, counterfeit
card using actual information), but not situation five (new account fraud).
Fraudsters would obtain the card or card data of a real cardholder and
would use it to purchase goods that would be shipped to the fraudster.
Contemporary fraud involves both existing account fraud and new account
fraud.83
The problem with CNP liability rules is that they do not account for
changed circumstances. Now, as before, merchants have little ability to

79. Admittedly, until the 1970s, fraud prevention for card-present transactions was also quite
difficult, as transactions were not authorized in real time. See ROSS J. ANDERSON, SECURITY
ENGINEERING: A GUIDE TO BUILDING DEPENDABLE DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS 394–95 (Carol A.
Long, ed., 2001); Steve Mott, Perhaps It’s Time to Mothball the Mighty Mag-Stripe, PYMTS
(2010), http://www.pymnts.com/perhaps-it-s-time-to-mothball-the-mighty-mag-stripe.
80. See ANDERSON, supra note 79, at 394.
81. Id. at 394.
82. See CYBERSOURCE, MANAGING RISK ON THE NET WHITE PAPER: WHAT INTERNET
MERCHANTS NEED TO KNOW 2 (2000), available at http://www.cybersource.com/resources/colla
teral/pdf/ifs_wp111500.pdf.
83. Joseph Campana, Identity Theft: More than Account Fraud: What Everyone Should Know
1 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.jcampana.com/JCampana
Documents/IdentityTheftMoreThanAccountFraud.pdf.
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prevent CNP fraud in any of these situations. The merchant’s role in the
transaction is limited to requiring whatever information the network and/or
issuer require. The merchant has no ability to verify the information or the
identity of the customer.84 Moreover, CNP merchants face substantially
higher interchange rates than card-present (CP) merchants in addition to a
different set of fraud rules.85
Issuers’ ability to prevent CNP fraud, however, has changed
dramatically. Advances in card security arguably make CNP transactions
safer than CP transactions.86 In a CNP transaction, it is easy to require the
cardholder to transmit not only the card account data and the Card
Verification Value (CVV),87 which is written on the back of the card and
not included in the card number on the front or on the mag stripe, but also
the billing address, billing telephone, or e-mail address information. If
additional information beyond the card account data—the account number,
the account holder’s name, and the expiry data—is required, then a
fraudster needs more than the physical card (which is easy to forge given
that mag stripe technology is now over thirty years old88) or a copy of the
face of the card to use the card successfully.
Accordingly, the issuer has the ability to prevent at least some CNP
fraud. The issuer can first verify the information supplied to the merchant to
ensure that it is a real account and that the card information matches the
CVV code on the back of the card. Second, the issuer can verify the billing
84. See Mann, Making Sense of Payments, supra note 8, at 6771 (noting that in CNP settings,
merchants lack a “credible mechanism for verifying the identity of the purported cardholder”).
85. See DELL LETTER, supra note 3, at Appendix 1 (listing the “Differential Between Card
Present and Card Not Present Visa Debit Interchange Fees”); Letter from Paul Misener, Vice
President for Global Pub. Policy, Amazon.com, to Louise L. Roseman, Dir., Div. of Reserve Bank
Operations and Payment Sys., Federal Reserve Board of Governors 14 (Nov. 20, 2010), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/amazon_comment_letter_20101120.pdf
(showing that there is as much as a 98 basis point and two cents difference in CNP and CP
interchange rates); see also Letter from Joshua R. Floum, Exec. Vice President, General Counsel
and Secretary, Visa U.S.A., Inc., to Louise L Roseman, Dir., Div. of Reserve Bank Operations and
Payment Sys., Federal Reserve Board of Governors 13 (Nov. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/files/visa_comment_letter20101118.pdf (noting that
interchange rates reflect fraud risks).
86. See generally VISA, GLOBAL VISA CARD-NOT-PRESENT MERCHANT GUIDE TO GREATER
FRAUD CONTROL: PROTECT YOUR BUSINESS AND YOUR CUSTOMERS WITH VISA’S LAYERS OF
SECURITY, available at http://usa.visa.com/download/merchants/global-visa-card-not-presentmerchant-guide-to-greater-fraud-control.pdf.
87. This code is variously called the Card Security Code (CSC), Card Verification Value
(CVV or CV2 or CVV2), Card Verification Value Code (CVVC), Card Verification Code (CVC),
Verification Code (V-Code or V Code), or Card Code Verification (CCV). The two included in
some abbreviations is to distinguish it from the code on the front on the card and mag stripe (the
card number). See Kimberly Kiefer Peretti, Data Breaches: What the Underground World of
“Carding” Reveals, SANTA CLARA COMP. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 375, 387 n. 66 (2009); see also
Card Security Code (CSC) and Card Verification Value (CVV), BOOTSTRAP,
http://mediakey.dk/~cc/card-security-code-csc-and-card-verification-value-cvv (last visited Oct.
19, 2010).
88. See Mott, supra note 79.
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address or other borrower information. Third, the issuer can use statistical
fraud prevention tools called neural networks that can identify anomalies in
spending behavior by analyzing transactions in relation to the cardholder’s
transaction history, looking for outliers in geography, merchant type, and
transaction amount. The speed of these networks allows issuers to prevent
suspicious transactions at the authorization stage.
Thus, if an 18-year old Peoria resident’s card was used at 5PM CDT to
make a purchase at a fast food restaurant in Peoria, and then used at 5:15PM
CDT to purchase a $2,000 dinner in Paris, there is likely a fraud occurring.
The issuer can deny the questionable transaction and freeze the account
until and unless the real cardholder contacts the issuer to unlock the account
by providing some additional verification information.89 Critically, only the
issuer has the ability to examine data from multiple transactions to observe
transaction patterns; merchants only observe one-off transactions.
Issuers’ ability to prevent unauthorized CNP transactions has advanced
by leaps and bounds since the 1970s, when MOTO transactions began.90
Moreover, issuers no longer need to be induced to authorize CNP
transactions; e-commerce is so well established that issuers cannot and
would not abandon the market if they were to bear liability for unauthorized
transactions.
The efficiency of CNP liability rules is suspect in light of changes in
the marketplace. Originally, it made sense for merchants to bear the risk of
fraud on CNP transactions because there was no effective avoidance and
because merchants gained the greatest benefit from the transactions. Now
issuers are the clear least cost avoider. Accordingly, placing the liability on
issuers would be the efficient outcome; indeed, it would likely encourage
greater security efforts, such as the use of two-factor identification methods
that rely on factors other than CVV and billing address, such as a randomly
generated PINs, which would be known only to the cardholder, absent
cardholder carelessness.91
C. MAKING SENSE OF THE LIABILITY RULES
Payment card network rules for allocating liability for unauthorized
transactions seem well-designed for card-present transactions, but are
89. To be sure, the issuer’s ability to prevent fraud is far from perfect. Small ticket, local
transactions are unlikely to get noticed. But compared to the merchant, the issuer has much greater
ability to avoid the fraud. Yet, liability for CNP transactions is not on the issuer.
90. ANDERSON, supra note 79, at 394.
91. To be sure, we might ask whether their current situation is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. Why
don’t merchants simply pay issuers for greater security measures up to the point where there
would be no marginal benefit? The answer is because of a coordination problem due to high
transactions—there are millions of merchants and thousands of issuers that must be coordinated—
and because of a free-riding problem. The benefits of improved issuer fraud prevention are shared
by all merchants. If any merchant paid for better security, it would have to share the benefits with
free-riders. Better, a merchant would calculate, to free-ride, than to be freely ridden.
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unlikely to be optimal in a CNP setting. Figure 2 summarizes the variations
between actual rules and the likely optimal rules, assuming that all
authorization procedures are properly followed by the merchant.
Figure 2. Actual and Likely Optimal Fraud Allocation Rules
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Why would the United States have suboptimal liability rules for
payment card networks? Part of the answer is historical. As Part II.B.
explained, for CNP transactions, rules that made sense in their original
context have ossified and become outmoded by changes in technology.
The history of the payment card networks themselves explains this
ossification. Until 2005–2006, MasterCard and Visa, the largest payment
card networks, were mutual organizations dominated by their large issuer
banks.92 The large issuer banks had little incentive to change the CNP
liability rules. Under the rules, issuers incur fraud losses that are only a
fraction of merchants’.93 Thus in 2009, issuers incurred $0.95 billion in total
(CP and CNP) fraud losses.94 In contrast, one study puts merchants’ total
fraud losses at over $100 billion.95 While issuers are the least cost avoiders,
they do not bear most of the costs of fraud. Therefore, they have little
incentive to engage in aggressive anti-fraud efforts.96 For example,
networks and issuers have persisted in using mag stripe cards with account
numbers embossed on the front.97 These cards are extremely vulnerable to
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1327–28.
LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY, supra note 1, at 23.
Kate Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 17.
LEXISNEXIS FRAUD STUDY, supra note 1, at 23.
In theory, in the credit card space, the other two networks, American Express and
Discover, could have tried competitive differentiation based on different CNP fraud rules.
However, these networks had little to gain from such differentiation. At best, it would increase
their merchant acceptance rates, but it would not necessarily garner them more transactions, as
merchants do not choose which card network a payment will be on. Moreover, these networks are
also their own primary issuers (and were their sole issuers before 2005), so the competitive
benefits from signing up more merchants would have to be weighed against the network-issuer
incurring greater fraud losses. The calculus, apparently, weighed in favor of keeping the losses on
merchants. For debit cards, CNP transactions have never been a critical issue because there are
very few CNP debit transactions. MOTO and Internet debit transactions are rare.
97. See Mott, supra note 79.
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skimming, to use when they are stolen, and to having account numbers
simply copied down and then used in CNP transactions.98 Simple steps such
as adopting Chip & PIN technology (discussed in more detail in the next
section) would frustrate skimming and theft, while card numbers need not
be displayed on the card.99
Anti-fraud efforts must be implemented by issuers, but the role of
setting standards falls to the network association itself. The problem is that
the network associations compete with each other for issuer membership.
The networks make most of their revenue from per transaction fees.100 This
means that they want to increase volume on their cards, which in turn
means that they need to have more cards in circulation. In order to increase
the number of cards, networks need to have more and larger issuers in their
stables. Networks thus compete for issuers.
If a network required greater anti-fraud measures from issuers, it would
impose additional costs on issuers and therefore make itself less attractive
to them. The full cost of anti-fraud would be borne by the issuer, but the
benefits would accrue primarily to the merchant, and issuers have little
interest in subsidizing merchants for the overall good of the network.
Mandating additional anti-fraud measures can cost a network market share,
while bringing the network itself no tangible benefit.
D. INTERNATIONAL VARIATION IN LIABILITY RULES AND FRAUD
ARBITRAGE
1. International Variation
There is significant international variation in payment card fraud
liability allocation rules.101 The international variation suggests that private
ordering does not always produce optimal results. It is possible that
98. Id.
99. The short-lived Revolution Card (purchased by Amex in 2010) did not have an account
number visible on the front and required a PIN for all transactions. See What is RevolutionCard?,
REVOLUTIONCARD, http://www.revolutioncard.com/what-is-revolutioncard.aspx (last visited Oct.
9, 2010)
RevolutionCards don’t display your name, signature or other personally identifying
information on the card, offering you unparalleled security. So, even if you lose your
card, no one knows it’s yours, and if they do find out, they can not use it without your
PIN. RevolutionCards are PIN-based, and members can create their own unique 4-digit
Card Authorization Code (CAC) that is entered as a PIN into the PIN-pads at merchants
locations, and can be used for online shopping and phone-orders. Cardholders can also
generate random One Time CAC numbers, so they never need to give out their primary
CAC/PIN when they are using the card for online purchases, phone or other card-notpresent transactions.
Id.

100. See DeGennaro, supra note 45, at 28.
101. See MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, §§ 3.9.1, at 11-1, 3.9.1(3), at 14-2
(corresponding rules in the Canada and the South Asia, Middle East, and Africa regions).
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different orderings are optimal in different countries, perhaps reflecting
variations in market penetration by payment cards. Yet there are variations,
even among very similarly developed economies with similar payment card
market penetration and usage patterns.
Such variation is evidence that private ordering might not always result
in optimal liability rules. But it does not tell us which, if any, of the private
orderings is optimal. There is reason to believe, however, that the private
ordering in the United States is suboptimal compared with systems around
the world. Financial institutions in virtually every developed economy
outside of the United States have adopted integrated circuit (IC), or chip
cards, as their standard.102 Chip cards contain a microchip in the card.103
The microchip is, like any microchip, multifunctional,104 but among its
chief purposes is that it allows a card reader that operates on the same
standard, known as EMV (short for EuroPay-MasterCard-Visa), to verify
the authenticity of the card. The chip is thus an anti-counterfeiting device.
Australia, Canada, Cambodia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, United Arab
Emirates, and virtually all of Europe have adopted EMV technology.105
Unlike the traditional mag stripe card, a chip card is quite difficult to
counterfeit.
The chip technology itself is only a protection against counterfeiting
physical cards, including duplication of actual cards. The chip does not
prevent unauthorized transactions if a card is stolen.106 In some countries
and regions, such as Australia, Canada, and Europe, financial institutions
have gone further to require Chip & PIN technology, where the IC card can
only be used with a PIN.107 Thus in Europe, all new, upgraded, or replaced
point-of-sale chip terminals must have a PIN pad.108
The PIN provides two-factor identification (the first factor being
possession of the card) where one factor is separate from the card (unlike
CVV), and helps ensure not only that the card is genuine, but that it is being
used by its authorized user.109 Thus, the Oliver Wyman Group reports that
in 2008 fraud loss rates on signature debit cards in the United States were
102. See John Hill & Victoria Conroy, EMV: The Story So Far, CARDS INT’L, Apr. 2009,
http://www.vrl-financial-news.com/asia-pacific/banking--payments-asia/issues/bpa-2009/bpa2009/emv-the-story-so-far.aspx; Thad Rueter, U.S. Stays on Sidelines As Other Nations Make
EMV Game Plans, CARDS & PAYMENTS, Nov. 2009, at 14, 16.
103. See Mott, supra note 79 (“Payment Cards ‘Smart’”).
104. Id. (“Is Contactless the New Hope?”).
105. Hill & Conroy, supra note 102; Rueter, supra note 102.
106. See Hill & Conroy, supra note 102.
107. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 12-3.9.1(3), at 12-15.
108. Id. (discussing PIN Entry Device Mandate for the European Region). In Europe, issuers
are also forbidden from authorizing CNP transactions unless there is CVC2 verification. Id. §
3.9.2, at 12-15 (“CVC Processing for Card-Not-Present Transactions”).
109. Claes Bell, Are Chip and PIN Credit Cards Coming?, BANKRATE.COM (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/credit-cards/are-chip-and-pin-credit-cards-coming-1.aspx.
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7.5 basis points, whereas PIN debit fraud loss rates were only one basis
point.110 Although Chip & PIN is not a failsafe technology, it is a far
stronger safety measure than anything on the American market.111
In the United States, only two cards have been rolled out with a chip:
the American Express Blue Card (Blue), first introduced in 1999,112 and the
United Nations Federal Credit Union (UNFCU) Visa card, introduced in
2010.113 Blue is American Express’s non-exclusive, mass-market card.114
Blue enables Amex to charge its premium merchant discount fee rates for
non-premium cardholders. While Amex equipped Blue cards with a chip,
the chip is useless as a security measure as almost no American merchants
have chip readers.115 Instead of serving as a security measure, the chip is
used for storing information about rewards programs.
The UNFCU Visa card, in contrast, does use Chip & PIN for security
reasons.116 UNFCU moved to Chip & PIN technology both because it
experienced particularly high fraud rates and because many of its members
use their cards outside of the United States in countries where Chip & PIN
is the norm and plain mag stripe cards are sometimes refused.117 In the
United States, though, the UNFCU Visa card operates just as a regular mag
stripe card, and it gains no security benefits from its Chip & PIN capability
due to the lack of Chip & PIN enabled point-of-sale terminals.118
Card network rules provide that use of Chip and Chip & PIN
technologies has been coupled with a shift in liability for card-present
transactions. Under the liability shift, merchants become, by default, liable
for all unauthorized card-present transactions.119 But, if the transaction used
a Chip reader, then the merchant will not be liable for losses from
counterfeit cards; instead liability will shift back to the issuer.120 Similarly,

110. Stephanie Bell, Study: Debit Fraud Rates Rose Sharply Last Year, AM. BANKER, May 21,
2010, at 6.
111. Stephen J. Murdoch et al., EMV PIN Verification “Wedge” Vulnerability, UNIV. OF
CAMBRIDGE, http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/research/security/banking/nopin (last visited Dec. 30,
2010); see also Ross Anderson et al., Chip and Spin (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://chipandspin.co.uk/spin.pdf; Saar Drimer et al., Optimised to Fail: Card Readers
for Online Banking 8–12 (Feb. 26–29, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/fc09optimised.pdf (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
112. Jennifer Kingson, A Credit Card Loses Its High-Tech Cred, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Dec.
5, 2008, 11:30 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/05/a-credit-card-loses-its-high-techcred.
113. David Morrison, United Nations FCU Becomes First Chip and PIN Card Issuer in the
U.S., CREDIT UNION TIMES (May 26, 2010), http://www.cutimes.com/Issues/2010/May-262010/Pages/United-Nations-FCU-Becomes-First-Chip-and-PIN-Card-Issuer-in-the-US.aspx.
114. Query, is “Blue” short for blue collar?
115. Morrison, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
119. MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 55, § 2.8.2.
120. Id.
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if the transaction is with a Chip & PIN card and is properly used with an
EMV reader, then liability for unauthorized transactions shifts back to the
issuer.121
These liability-shifting rules are consciously designed to encourage
merchant adoption of EMV readers. Some card networks have also
encouraged this shift by imposing an “incentive interchange rate”—
interchange penalties and rewards. In some regions, MasterCard offers a ten
basis point reduction in interchange for Chip & PIN transactions, and
imposes a ten basis point penalty for non-Chip & PIN card-present
transactions.122
At least for MasterCard, the decision of whether to implement a Chip
liability shift is left up to the financial institution members of the network—
not the merchants who are also affected. MasterCard permits a Chip
liability shift program in any country or region in which MasterCard
member financial institutions representing “75 percent of the currency
volume of both acquiring and issuing transactions” approve.123 Thus,
Europe has had a Chip liability shift since January 1, 2005, Brazil since
March 1, 2008, Columbia since October 1, 2008, and Venezuela since July
1, 2009. In Canada, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East the shift took effect
on October 15, 2010.124 Intraregionally, Europe, Latin America, and the
Caribbean have had Chip liability shifts since 2005.125

121. Id.; VISA DISPUTE PROCEDURES, supra note 68, at 102 (noting that a chargeback is invalid
“if the Device is EMV PIN-Compliant and the Transaction was correctly processed to completion
in accordance with EMV and VIS using the Chip Card data”).
For purposes of these Rules, “EMV-compliant” means in compliance with the EMV
standards then in effect.
1. Chip Liability Shift. The liability for intraregional counterfeit fraudulent Transactions in
which one Regional Member (either the Issuer or the Acquirer) is not yet EMV-compliant
is borne by the non–EMV-compliant Regional Member.
2. Chip/PIN Liability Shift. The liability for intraregional lost, stolen, and never received
fraudulent Transactions in which one Regional Member (either the Issuer or the Acquirer)
is not yet able to support chip/PIN Transactions is borne by the non-chip/PIN-compliant
Regional Member.
MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 3.9.1, at 12-14.
122. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 3.9.1(2), at 10-2 (applicable to the Asia & Pacific
Region); id. § 3.9.1(4), at 10-3 (applicable to the Latin America and Caribbean Region); id. §
3.9.1(2), at 14-2 (applicable to the South Asia, Middle East and Africa Regions). This implies that
MasterCard believes that in these regions, the total costs of fraud borne by merchants plus the cost
of investing in Chip & PIN readers is less than twenty basis points.
123. MASTERCARD CHARGEBACK GUIDE, supra note 55, §2.8.2.4.1.1, at 2-54.
124. MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 3.9.1, at 11-1 (corresponding to the Canada
Region); id. § 3.9.1(3), at 14-2, 14-3 (corresponding to the South Asia, Middle East, and Africa,
regions).
125. MASTERCARD WORLDWIDE, CIRRUS WORLDWIDE OPERATING RULES, § 11.1.1 (Sept. 15,
2010). As MasterCard notes:
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The absence of Chip & PIN technology in the United States bears
comment. It is widely recognized that Chip & PIN technology significantly
reduces fraud losses.126 In the UK, losses on fraud in face-to-face (cardpresent) transactions fell from £135.9 in 2005 to £72.1M in 2009.127 So why
hasn’t Chip & PIN been adopted in the United States?
An initial answer may be that it is simply not efficient from a systemwide perspective. While readily comparable international fraud loss rate
data is not available, the United States was historically reputed to have
relatively low fraud loss rates, in part due to low cost telecommunications
that made real-time authorization possible.128 Moreover, total fraud losses
on payment cards are noticeably lower than on competing payment
methods, such as checks.129 If payment card fraud costs are sufficiently low,
then there may simply not be an economic case for adopting Chip & PIN.
On the other hand, a recent study estimates that U.S. payment card fraud
losses rates are higher in the U.S. than in Australia, France, Spain, and the
UK.130
It is not clear, however, whether Chip & PIN would be an inefficient
overinvestment in fraud prevention technology. Another explanation is that
Chip & PIN implementation is actually an efficient investment, but it is
stymied by the organization of and conflicts of interest in payment card
networks, which fail to properly incentivize parties to take optimal care in
preventing fraud.

EMV chip technology can provide a more secure alternative to non-chip technology for
reducing fraudulent Transactions. Therefore, certain countries and Regions have
decided to migrate to the EMV chip platform.
Many of these same countries and Regions have instituted a chip liability shift program
for domestic and intraregional Transactions to protect Members that have made the
early investment in EMV chip.
...
Chip liability shift means that when a counterfeit fraud Transaction occurs in a country
or Region that has migrated to the Chip platform the liability for the Transactions will
shift to the non-chip-compliant party.
Id.

126. See Rueter, supra note 102.
127. Facts and Figures, UK CARDS ASS’N, http://www.theukcardsassociation.org.uk/view_po
int_and_publications/facts_and_figures (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
128. See Mann, Credit Cards and Debit Cards, supra note 8, at 1069–70, 1090–91 (noting the
role of telecommunications costs in determining payment card fraud resistance).
129. Chris Costanzo, Combating Fraud, BANK DIRECTOR MAG., Q1 2007,
http://www.bankdirector.com/issues/articles.pl?article_id=11865. It is unclear if fraud loss rates
are lower for checks currently; historically they were. See William Roberds, The Impact of Fraud
on New Methods of Retail Payment, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., 2Q 1998, at
42, 45, available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/Roberd.pdf (noting a 2 basis point
loss rate for checks compared with 18 basis point loss for credit cards in 1995).
130. Sullivan, supra note 1, at 110, 112–14.
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Merchants have no ability to adopt Chip & PIN; they are not part of
card networks and cannot change card network rules. Moreover, there is
little reason for them to invest in Chip & PIN enabled point-of-sale
terminals unless issuers are issuing Chip & PIN Cards. As acquirers pass
fraud costs through to merchants, they have little interest in the matter.
Only issuers have a direct interest and are part of card networks. Issuers,
however, do not want to incur the cost of having to reissue cards to make
them Chip & PIN capable. The counterfeiting losses in the United States do
not justify the reissuance expense of issuers, and for debit cards, issuers do
not want to see transactions shift from signature debit cards (which have
higher interchange rates) to PIN debit cards.131 Card network organization
structure and economics frustrate the adoption of the best technology for
fraud prevention.
2. Fraud Arbitrage
International variation in fraud liability and security rules creates
opportunities for fraud arbitrage, thereby undermining security systems.
Fraudsters, often highly organized, use cards from more secure locations in
less secure ones.132
In particular, the lack of Chip & PIN protection in the United States
undermines Chip & PIN systems abroad.133 For example, Canada has
adopted Chip & PIN technology, but Canadian credit cards can be used to
pay in the United States.134 When a Canadian card is used in the United
States, it is used without a Chip & PIN because almost no American
merchants have Chip & PIN capable readers.135 Canadian fraudsters know
that they merely have to use stolen Canadian card numbers in the United
States. Furthermore, Canadian consumers and merchants might be less
vigilant about protecting their physical cards because of the lulling effect of
131. Kate Fitzgerald, Calculating the Cost: Debit Fees Could be Cut by $5B, AM. BANKER,
June 28, 2010, at 1 (noting higher interchange rates on signature debit cards than on PIN debit
cards). This shift may happen regardless because of the Durbin Interchange Amendment. DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1075,
124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010).
132. See Rueter, supra note 105, at 14, 17.
133. US at Risk of Becoming “A Centre For Card Fraud”, CARDS INT’L, AUG. 2010,
http://www.vrl-financial-news.com/cards--payments/cards-international/issues/ci-2010/ci-445446/us-at-risk-of-becoming-a-centr.aspx; Ian Kerr, Challenges in Migrating to EMV, ATM MEDIA
RESOURCE CENTRE (Mar. 11, 2010, 3:19 PM), http://www.atmindustryinfo.com/2010/03/chall
enges-in-migrating-to-emv.html (fraud migrated from EMV adopters in Singapore and Malaysia
to non-EMV Thailand); Rueter, supra note 102, at 14 (discussing shift of fraud from EMVenabled UK to non-EMV countries and from Canada to US with Canadian adoption of Chip &
PIN security).
134. See Rueter, supra note 102.
135. For example, Wal-Mart’s POS terminals are Chip & PIN capable, but Wal-Mart does not
actually use the terminals for Chip & PIN transactions when presented with a Chip & PIN card.
See Kate Fitzgerald, Wal-Mart Claims Issuers Block Progress of EMV Cards in U.S., AM.
BANKER, May 24, 2010, at 7.
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two-factor Chip & PIN identification; Canadian consumers believe that the
card by itself is useless without the PIN—and it is—but not when the card
is used south of the border.
Another variation of this international fraud arbitrage problem is the use
of European cards in the United States. The Chip & PIN arbitrage also
exists between Europe and the United States, but there is another variation
in security as well.136 In the United States, real time authorization is the key
line of fraud prevention.137 Because of historically high telecommunications
costs, however, Europe does not use real time authorization systems.138
Instead, European anti-fraud efforts were channeled into better security
features in the cards and the terminals—Chip & PIN.139 When European
cards are used in the United States, the worst of both worlds exists. The
superior card and terminal security features are not functional, and there is
no real time authorization.
III. REGULATORY INTERVENTIONS
A. THE COORDINATION PROBLEM IN PAYMENT CARD NETWORKS
The problems of international fraud arbitrage speak to the core
coordination issue in payment systems. Payment systems are the backbone
of the economy; they are the infrastructure of commerce. Payment systems
allow commerce to move beyond barter by creating a common liquid
medium for exchanging value. Liquidity requires standardization.
Standardization is the lubricant of exchange, and every successful payment
medium has been standardized to a greater or lesser degree: wampum, cell
phone minutes, gold, or electronic payment commands.
Standardization includes standardized security measures. The security
measures (or lack thereof) of individual participants in a payment system
may have positive or negative externalities on other system participants. A
participant’s strong security measures can help deter fraud generally and
catch fraudsters as well as frustrate attempts to obtain data that can be used
to defraud other system participants. Similarly, lax security measures (such
as poor data security) can result in fraud losses at other system participants.
Payment system participants do not internalize these costs or benefits,
however, so left to their own devices, they may not achieve the optimal
level of security.140 Mandatory coordination among system participants is

136. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 115 (noting that with Chip & PIN adoption in the UK, UK
counterfeit card fraud is now mainly done on transactions in the U.S. because of lack of Chip &
PIN adoption in U.S.).
137. Rueter, supra note 102, at 16.
138. See Mott, supra note 79; see also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
139. See Kerr, supra note 133.
140. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 118.
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critical, then, for optimizing security measures and promoting positive
externalities.
Accordingly, participation in various payment systems is dependent
upon abiding by system standards. These standards are sometimes indirect
and mandatory by public law, such as bank safety and soundness
requirements like Know Your Customer rules. Other times, they are private
law that operate through contract, such as membership in a payment card
network or a check clearinghouse or automated clearinghouse.
Standardization requires a standard setting process. One of the major
roles of payment card networks is standard setting. For multi-institution
networks, this is a tremendous coordination task. International fraud
arbitrage shows that in a global economy, international standards are
needed for data security.141 It is insufficient for standards to be nationally
based. If electronic payments are to be global currency, they need uniform
security standards.
Setting standards in payment card networks involves coordinating
between multiple parties.142 For multi-issuer networks, such as MasterCard,
Visa, and all the PIN debit networks, it is necessary to coordinate between
numerous issuers and acquirers. This often involves the network acting
unilaterally; the transaction costs of individual issuer-acquirer negotiations
for networks that can involve 16,000143 financial institutions are simply too
great. Similarly, merchants’ dealings with the networks via their acquirer
banks cannot readily be individually negotiated; there would need to be too
many negotiations. Coasean bargaining is not possible given the transaction
costs in multi-party networks.
Given the impracticality of Coasean bargaining with payment systems,
how can we hope to optimize outcomes? The answer lies in highlighting
both cooperative and competitive features of payment card networks.
Payment card networks represent an unusual confluence of competition and
cooperation, or as David Evans and Richard Schmalensee have termed it,
“co-opetition.”144 Improving fraud loss liability allocations involves two
seemingly contradictory moves, each of which playing to a different aspect
of co-opetition. First, coordination problems can be smoothed over by
encouraging greater security coordination between card networks (and their
participants). Second, antitrust enforcement on the long-simmering
interchange issue—which has been only partially resolved by the Durbin

141. See supra Part II.D.2.
142. See supra Part I.A.
143. VISA INC., CORPORATE OVERVIEW 2, available at http://phx.corporate-ir.net/External.File
?item=UGFyZW50SUQ9NDYxMzZ8Q2hpbGRJRD0tMXxUeXBlPTM=&t=1.
144. DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, PAYING WITH PLASTIC: THE DIGITAL
REVOLUTION IN BUYING AND BORROWING 7 (2nd ed. 2005).
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Interchange Amendment145 and the antitrust litigation brought by the
Department of Justice and seven states against MasterCard, Visa, and
American Express146—will ensure that there is true price competition in the
payment card market between networks and merchants. As fraud liability is
a component of price, enabling price competition will help achieve a result
closer to that of Coasean bargaining. In the presence of overwhelming
transaction costs, strong competition can substitute for Coasean bargaining.
B. ENCOURAGE BETTER GOVERNANCE FOR SECURITY STANDARD
COORDINATION
Payment card security measures are largely undertaken at the network
level;147 the network mandates particular practices, and issuers and
acquirers must comply.148 Despite most security measures being mandated
on the network level, networks do not compete on security measures for
end-users. Merchants, who bear the bulk of fraud losses, are indifferent to
variations in networks’ security measures. Most merchants accept cards
from multiple networks, and to the extent that they do not accept particular
networks’ cards, it is usually because of interchange fees, not security rule
variations. Merchants typically get bundled acquiring (or at least
processing) services; the acquirer or processor will handle all of the
merchant’s payment card transactions using the same interface.149 Thus,
from the merchant’s perspective there is no difference between card
networks except pricing; security distinctions are invisible to the merchants.
Similarly, consumers are utterly indifferent to network-level security
mandates. The federal consumer liability limitation for unauthorized
payment card transactions and the networks’ zero liability policies for
unauthorized transactions reduce consumers’ incentive to care about card
security measures.150 Consumers have no contractual privity with the
network and see no difference in card functionality between networks. A
MasterCard and a Visa credit card are completely interchangeable from a
consumer’s perspective, and issuers will sometimes switch consumer’s
accounts among networks. Likewise, the same debit card is often an access
device for multiple debit card networks: Accel, Cirrus, Interlink, NYCE,
145. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 1075, 124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010).
146. See Complaint, United States v. Am. Exp., Co., No. 1:10-cv-04496 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 4,
2010) (alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act based on various card
network merchant restraint rules); [Proposed] Final Judgment, United States v. Am. Exp., Co., No.
1:10-cv-04496 (E.D.N.Y., Oct. 4, 2010).
147. Douglass, supra note 9, at 45.
148. See id.; Ballen & Fox, supra note 9, at 940–41.
149. See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 144, at 6–7.
150. Note, however, that not all debit card networks have zero liability policies. Given the low
rate of PIN debit fraud and the existing Regulation E limitations on consumer liability, such a zero
liability policy would not mean much to consumers.
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Plus, Pulse, Star, etc.151 Consumers never select what networks will have
preferred routing flags on their debit cards; that choice is left to their banks.
While most security features are mandated by the networks, there is
variation among issuers in security features and practices. In particular,
issuers’ fraud detection relies heavily on neural networks, but individual
issuers have their own neural network designs. Consumers have little reason
to care about variations in issuer anti-fraud measures, as they are almost
never themselves liable, and, perhaps more importantly, they cannot gauge
the value of anti-fraud technologies. There is no way for a consumer to
know whether a particular issuer’s technology is better than another’s.
Fraud protection is not like a burglar alarm. There are a limited number of
ways into a dwelling, and a consumer can, in theory, test an alarm system
against simulated burglary. The same cannot be done for card fraud.
Because payment card end-users are indifferent to variations in
networks’ anti-fraud measures, there is little reason to foster competition
among networks on security measures. Bundled merchant services and
consumer indifference mean that networks have little incentive to compete
in terms of security measures. Indeed, because the costs of security
measures are borne by issuers, while most of the benefits accrue to
merchants, issuers are resistant to greater security measures. A network that
unilaterally imposes more demanding and costly security measures risks
losing issuer business to other networks.
Given that the market is structured against competition for heightened
security measures, how can we encourage greater security measures in
payment card networks? One way is to encourage coordination among
networks. If networks could coordinate security measures, they could adopt
them uniformly, thereby eliminating market pressure from issuers for lower
security measures. Security measures are an area where we might actually
want some type of standard setting. (And, to the extent that we view
security standards as a form of price, price-fixing!)
Network coordination should be guided by the principle of locating
what method would benefit the overall payment card industry—that is, a net
social welfare gain—rather than what would increase the size of any
particular network—that is, a gain to any particular competitor.
Coordination on security measures would essentially liberate the networks
to engage in more effective allocation of that portion of price among
network participants.
The card networks have already devised a corporatist form of
coordination using the Payment Card Industry Security Standards

151. See, e.g., FUMIKO HAYASHI, RICHARD SULLIVAN & STUART E. WEINER, PAYMENT SYS.
RESEARCH DEP’T, FED. RES. BANK OF KANSAS CITY, A GUIDE TO THE ATM AND DEBIT CARD
INDUSTRY 20 (2003), available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/PSR/BksJournArticles/
ATMpaper.pdf.
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Council.152 PCI SSC is a nominally independent organization created by the
card networks to promulgate non-binding data security standards for
payment cards.153 PCI SSC is owned by the five major credit card networks
(American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International (Japan
Commerce Bank), MasterCard WorldWide, and Visa, Inc.).154 Each
network appoints an officer to the PSC SSC executive committee and
management committee. PCI SSC has 612 “participating organizations,”
including financial institutions and intermediaries of various sorts, trade
associations, and merchants ranging from Wal-Mart to the University of
Notre Dame.155 Participating organizations get to nominate and vote for the
PCI SSC’s twenty-member Board of Advisors (which currently only has
four representatives from entities classified as “merchants”) and to review
proposed PCI standards and revisions thereto, including the Payments Card
Industry Data Security Standards (PCI DSS), before they are made public.
Neither participating organization nor the Board of Advisors has any formal
ability to determine the standards.156 While PCI SSC cannot itself enforce
the PCI DSS because it does not have a contractual relationship with card
network participants, all of the networks incorporate the PCI DSS in their
rules, and require network participants to be PCI DSS compliant.157
To date, the operation of the PCI SSC has been controversial.158
Networks and issuers play a leading role in PCI SSC, and merchant groups
complain that PCI DSS is geared toward advancing issuers’ interests.159 In
particular, merchant groups object to PCI SSC data retention requirements,
which issuers want because of chargeback issues.160 PCI SSC requires
152. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 214–15.
153. Id. at 215.
154. About the PCI Security Standards Council, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
organization_info/index.php (last viewed Dec. 30, 2010).
155. Participating
Organizations,
PCI
SECURITY
STANDARDS
COUNCIL,
https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/get_involved/member_list.php?category=&region=
(last
viewed Dec. 30, 2010).
156. Participating Organization Rights, Obligations and Rules of Participation, PCI SECURITY
STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/get_involved/rights_responsibilities.
php (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
157. See Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 214–215; see also DISCOVER MERCHANT
OPERATING REGULATIONS, supra note 67, at ix; AMERICAN EXPRESS MERCHANT REFERENCE
GUIDE—U.S. (Apr. 2010), supra note 67, § 8.3; VISA INT’L REGULATIONS, supra note 67, at 684.
Non-compliant merchants face higher, penalty interchange rates. The particular form of this
coordination is shaped by antitrust concerns. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 215.
158. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 120.
159. Id.
160. See David Taylor, Moving Beyond PCI, CARDS & PAYMENTS, May 2009, at 40 (noting
that “tokenization, seeks to remove card data from the retail environment as soon as possible and
substitute account numbers with ‘fake,’ or one-time, numbers that have no intrinsic market
value”); Avivah Litan, Where to Begin for End-to-End Encryption Systems, AM. BANKER, Sept.
15, 2009, at 15 (arguing that “[p]ayments companies will also need to change some business
processes, so that merchants are not required to hold on to card data for business purposes, such as
resolving chargebacks, or preauthorization and presettlement processes”).
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merchants to retain certain transaction data.161 While the data is supposed to
be encrypted and otherwise protected, merchants object that the mere
presence of large volumes of transaction data make them tempting targets
for fraudsters.162
Moreover, the effectiveness of the PCI DSS is unclear. Heartland
Payment Systems, Inc., a major card processor, was subjected to hacking
from December 2007 until October 2008, during which time 130 million
records were stolen.163 Heartland was certified as PCI DSS compliant in
April 2008.164 Visa disputes Heartland’s PCI DSS compliance.165 In 2009, a
data security breach occurred at Network Solutions, which had also been
certified as PCI DSS compliant.166
These incidents raise the question of what benefit there is to payment
card network participants of becoming PCI DSS compliant. PCI DSS
compliance is extremely expensive, but might not ultimately protect them
from data breaches and liability for the expenses caused by the breach,
including reissuance of cards.167
As a concept, inter-network security coordination for payment systems
makes sense. The PCI SCC is designed to facilitate coordination between
competing payment card networks. This is an important goal, with
potentially precompetitive effects through positive security externalities.
Nevertheless, the PCI SCC’s structure raises serious antitrust concerns. In
execution, PCI DSS might be skewed by the dynamics of payment card
network economics as well, and reflect the interest of issuers—the most
price elastic type of network participant—rather than the overall interests of
all network participants. In other words, the structure of the PCI SCC raises
concerns that PCI DSS is being used to bolster the pre-existing problems in
the payment card interchange fee system.
Given the significant benefits that can come from data security standard
setting, standard-setting processes should be encouraged. But it is also
important that they be fair. Standard setting needs to be a tool to further
161. See DISCOVER MERCHANT OPERATING REGULATIONS, supra note 67, §§ 4.1.3, 7.1.5.
162. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 119.
163. Indictment at 3, United States v. Gonzalez, No. 09-cr-00626-JBS (D. N.J., Aug. 17, 2009);
Kim Zetter, TJX Hacker Charged with Heartland, Hannaford Breaches, WIRED (Aug. 17, 2009,
2:34 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/08/tjx-hacker-charged-with-heartland.
164. Alex Goldman, Heartland Hit With $12M Breach Tab, INTERNETNEWS.COM (May 8,
2009), http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3819596; Jaikumar Vijayan, Heartland
Breach Shows Why Compliance Is Not Enough, PC WORLD (Jan. 6, 2010, 11:15 AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/article/186036/heartland_breach_shows_why_compliance_is_not_enoug
h.html; Zetter, supra note 163.
165. Linda McGlasson, Heartland Data Breach: Visa Questions Processor's PCI Compliance,
BANKINFO SECURITY (Mar. 24, 2009), http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id
=1309.
166. Linda McGlasson, Top 9 Breaches of 2009, CU INFO SECURITY (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.cuinfosecurity.com/articles.php?art_id=2001&pg=1.
167. See Steven Mott, Why POS Merchants Don’t Buy into Payment Security, DIGITAL
TRANSACTIONS (Sept. 7, 2007), http://www.digitaltransactions.net/index.php/news/story/1503.
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competition, not to squelch it. This suggests two seemingly contradictory
regulatory interventions: encouragement of inter-network coordination for
data security setting and more vigorous antitrust enforcement. Standard
setting should be encouraged, but only with a more adequately
representative and fair governance structure that provides a balance of
interest and due process.
The precise mechanics of a reformed payment system security standard
setting are beyond the scope of this Article, but given the critical
infrastructure utility role that payment card networks play in commercial
transactions and the law enforcement resources involved, some level of
government involvement to ensure that standards are set through a fair
process that produces socially optimal outcomes is appropriate.168 Already,
the Durbin Interchange Amendment provides for the Federal Reserve to
consider fraud prevention costs and technology in its rule-making regarding
debit card interchange fees.169
Government involvement in payment card data security need not mean
government setting of security standards. Instead, the involvement could be
limited to government supervision of process. Because of its lack of formal
procedural requirements, the PCI DSS standard setting process should be
relatively nimble, but this comes at the expense of due process and adequate
representation of all constituencies involved in payment card transactions,
including merchants, consumers, and law enforcement. Payment card data
security needs coordination between ostensible competitors, but if such
coordination is to be permitted, it must be through a process that does not
allow competing networks to leverage security standard setting to further
their own economic interests at the expense of optimal security standards.
C. MORE VIGOROUS PAYMENTS ANTITRUST POLICY
The other concurrent approach that should be pursued is to improve
inter-network competition for merchants’ business. As the situation
currently stands, networks compete with each other primarily for issuers,
not for merchants. The goal of networks is to increase network transaction
volume, and that requires getting as many of their cards in circulation as
possible. Maximizing cards in circulation requires vigorous recruiting of
issuers.
Once a network signs up issuers, it will get its cards out to consumers,
and once a consumer presents the network’s card at a merchant, the network
168. Carl Cargill & Sherri Bolin, Standardization: A Failing Paradigm, in STANDARDS AND
PUBLIC POLICY 296, 312, 316 (Shane Greenberg & Victor Stango, eds., 2007) (arguing that
standards are an “impure public good” which justifies government intervention when private
standard setting processes fail).
169. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1075(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010) (amending § 920 of The Electronic Fund
Transfer Act).

2010]

Private Disordering?

37

has a monopoly on processing the transaction. This means that the networks
do not have to court merchants as assiduously as they do issuers. To be
sure, a merchant can opt-out of accepting a particular network’s cards, and
some do, particularly for American Express;170 but as long as the credit and
signature networks all price fairly similarly for credit, signature debit, and
PIN debit, respectively, there is no reason for a merchant to take one
network brand and not another. Moreover, the complexity of interchange
rates makes it difficult for merchants to even determine what relative
pricing is between networks, as pricing depends on the type of card and the
level of rewards, as well as the merchant’s industry.171 Because card
network competition has focused on competition for issuers, rather than
both issuers and merchants, the cost of payment card acceptance, including
fraud liability, is structured to favor issuers.
The Durbin Interchange Amendment will change this situation by
creating more competition for merchant business—but only for debit cards
and small dollar credit card transactions. The Durbin Amendment requires
that debit card interchange fees be “reasonable and proportional to the cost
incurred by the issuer,” meaning the incremental cost of a transaction, with
an issuer-specific adjustment for fraud prevention costs, as determined by
the Federal Reserve.172 This provision could result in debit interchange
pricing that strongly encourages the use of PIN or Chip & PIN technology;
regulatory intervention might accomplish the optimal end that privateordering has failed to do. It will take the outcome of the Federal Reserve’s
rule-making, to be finalized in early 2011,173 before the ultimate effect is
clear.
The Durbin Amendment also permits merchants to offer discounts
(including in-kind discounts) to incentivize consumer use of particular
payment systems;174 and, critically, the Durbin Amendment forbids network
exclusivity on debit cards and lets merchants choose the routing of debit
transactions.175 Thus, debit cards will be capable of “multi-homing”—
clearing over multiple networks,176 and merchants, rather than issuers, will
decide which networks. The result should be that networks have to compete
more for merchant routing decisions, which means lowering costs, be it
direct pecuniary costs like interchange fees or indirect costs like fraud
170. See Meghan Boyer, Discover Striving To Raise U.S. Merchants’ Awareness Of CardAcceptance Abilities, PAYMENTSSOURCE, Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.paymentssource.com/news/3001446-1.html.
171. See Levitin, Economic Costs, supra note 19, at 1323.
172. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 1075(a)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 2068–74 (2010) (amending § 920 of The Electronic Fund
Transfer Act).
173. Id. § 1075(b)(1)(A).
174. Id. § 1075(b)(2)(A).
175. Id. § 1075(b)(1)(A).
176. Id. § 1075(b)(1)(B).
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liability. The Durbin Amendment is likely to affect not just debit cards, but
also credit cards to the extent that credit competes with debit for small
ticket transactions.
The Durbin Amendment is not a complete solution to the competition
problems in the payment systems marketplace, but it opens the door to a
rationalization of the fraud liability rules for merchants and issuers.
IV. LIMITATIONS OF CONSUMER LIABILITY: A DEFENSE
A. CONSUMER LIABILITY RULES FOR UNAUTHORIZED PAYMENT
CARD TRANSACTIONS
The most major federal intervention in payment system loss allocation
is the limitation by federal law of consumer liability for unauthorized
transactions.177 Consumer liability for unauthorized credit card transactions
is limited to $50, and the consumer has no liability once the consumer has
notified the card issuer about the loss, theft, or possible unauthorized use of
the card.178 The burden of proof to show that the use was authorized is on
the card issuer.179
For debit cards, consumer liability is generally limited to $50,180 but it
increases to a maximum of $500 if the consumer does not notify the issuer
within two business days of learning of the loss or theft of the card, and the
card issuer establishes that the transactions would not have occurred had
there been timely notice.181 In addition, if the consumer does not report an
unauthorized transaction that appears on a periodic account statement
within sixty days of the transmittal of the statement, then the consumer
incurs unlimited liability for all unauthorized transactions that occur
between the end of those sixty days and notice to the issuer, provided that
the issuer can show that the transactions would not have occurred had there
been timely notice.182 These time limits can be extended for extenuating
circumstances, such as extended travel or hospitalization.183 Again, in all
177. The legal definition of “unauthorized transaction” is somewhat different for credit cards
and debit cards. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b)(1) (2010) (defining “unauthorized use” as “the
use of a credit card by a person other than the cardholder, who does not have actual, implied, or
apparent authority for such use, and from which the cardholder receives no benefit”), with 15
U.S.C. § 1693a(11) (2010), and 12 C.F.R. § 205.2(m) (2010) (defining an “unauthorized
electronic fund transfer” as “an electronic fund transfer from a consumer’s account initiated by a
person other than the consumer without actual authority to initiate the transfer and from which the
consumer receives no benefit” and then noting several exceptions). These distinctions do not
matter, however, for the purposes of this Article. See Gillette, supra note 8, at 200–02 (discussing
the public choice issues with payment card liability limitation rules).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 1643 (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 226.12(b).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1643(b).
180. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(1) (2010).
181. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(2).
182. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(3).
183. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(a); 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(4).
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cases, the burden of proof to show that a transaction was in fact authorized
is on the card issuer.184
These rules apply to all unauthorized usage, not just fraud, which is the
focus of this Article. The federal liability rules thus create something close
to a strict liability regime for credit card fraud and a strict liability scheme
with an exception for contributory negligence for debit cards.185 It is worth
noting that liability for unauthorized payment card transactions contrasts
with checks, where there is no consumer liability for unauthorized
transactions (meaning orders of payment) whatsoever, absent consumer
negligence that “substantially contributes” to the fraud.186 Whereas the
checking system has a true contributory negligence scheme, credit cards are
strict liability, and debit cards are strict liability with contributory
negligence regarding the amount, but not the fact, of the loss.
B. THE CASE AGAINST MANDATORY LIABILITY RULES
Epstein and Brown contend that consumer liability for unauthorized
transactions should not be capped by statute, as they “see no reason even
for this (modest) restriction on freedom of contract. If payment card
companies think larger penalties are appropriate and disclose such penalties
to consumers, the losses should not be socialized as a matter of law.”187
While Epstein and Brown’s major complaint about the mandatory
liability caps is that it could frustrate more efficient private bargaining over
liability, that is not the only problem with the mandatory liability rules for
unauthorized transactions. The mandatory liability rules also create a moral
hazard and effectuate a wealth redistribution from consumers who engage
in low-risk behavior to consumers who engage in high-risk behavior. The
limitation on consumer liability, in most cases to $50 (which is not inflation
indexed), provides little pecuniary incentive for consumers to take care in
their transactions and with their cards. Moreover, given the difficulties in
proving first-party fraud, with the burden of showing unauthorized
transactions resting on the card issuer, the liability limitation creates a very
real moral hazard of first-party fraud.
In addition, the liability rules create a perverse redistribution that
rewards high-risk behavior. Low-risk consumers might prefer to incur more
potential liability in exchange for savings on other payment card price
terms. By being pooled with high-risk consumers under the same
184. 15 U.S.C. § 1693g(b).
185. There is a rich literature which considers the differences in fraud and error liability rules
for different payment systems and whether they should be harmonized. See supra note 8.
186. U.C.C. § 3-401(a) (2006) (no liability on instrument without signature); id. § 3-403
(unauthorized signature on instrument is only effective as that of the unauthorized signer); id. § 3406 (liability if negligence “substantially contributes” to fraud on instrument). Uniform
Commercial Code Article 3 does not distinguish between consumer and nonconsumer drawers of
checks.
187. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 219.
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mandatory liability rules, the low-risk consumers are being forced to forgo
these potential savings for the benefit of high-risk consumers. The result is
to penalize precisely those consumers whose behavior should be
encouraged. In such circumstances, a rational consumer will be incentivized
to engage in higher-risk behavior in order to be a recipient, rather than the
payee of the subsidy.
Notably, MasterCard188 and Visa189 both have so-called “zero liability”
policies that reduce consumer liability in many cases beneath the federal
liability cap.190 These caps essentially install a negligence regime for
liability up to $50, after which the federal strict liability regimes take over.
Epstein and Brown argue that the zero liability policies demonstrate that
“[m]arket pressures have pushed the balance still further, insulating
payment card users from essentially all fraud losses.”191 In other words, the
federal law is an unnecessary (but fortunately harmless) intervention.
Indeed, as Duncan Douglass has observed, the zero liability policy arguably
creates a moral hazard, as consumers have little reason to take care to
protect their cards and card data.192
C. IN DEFENSE OF THE CONSUMER LIABILITY LIMITATIONS
Despite the problems created by the mandatory liability caps, there is
nevertheless a good case supporting them. Absent the mandatory caps, the
zero liability policies might not obtain and adverse selection,
disproportionate negotiation costs, information asymmetries, consumer
hyperbolic discounting and optimism biases, the relative salience of
different price points to consumers, and consumers’ limited ability to
absorb losses relative to other payment card network participants all
militate for capping consumer liability.
1. Counterfactual Consideration
Epstein and Brown’s reading of the impact of the zero liability policy is
reasonable, but it is hardly the only fair interpretation. First, it is worth
188. Zero Liability, MASTERCARD, http://www.mastercard.com/us/personal/en/cardholder
services/zeroliability.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
189. Zero Liability, VISA, http://usa.visa.com/personal/security/visa_security_program/zero_
liability.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
190. Bank of America offers its own “zero liability” policy. See, e.g., Bank of America Merrill
Lynch Visa® Reward Card Terms and Conditions, BANK OF AMERICA,
https://prepaid.bankofamerica.com/RewardCard/PRC384/CP384-T00-002/docs/terms.htm
(last
visited Dec. 30, 2010). It is important to remember that the stated zero liability policy is not zero
liability. It is conditional on the cardholder having taken reasonable care (in the issuer’s view), the
cardholder having had no more than two other incidents in the last year, and the cardholder’s
account being “in good standing.” See, e.g., MASTERCARD RULES, supra note 67, § 3.11(2), at 157 (conditions governing cardholder liability in the United States). Zero liability is great marketing,
but it is not clear how often it is really zero liability.
191. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 219.
192. Douglass, supra note 9, at 46.
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considering a counterfactual scenario. What would the world look like
without the federal $50 liability limitation on credit cards? Would Visa and
MasterCard have adopted zero liability policies? Maybe. The zero liability
policy was only adopted in 2000,193 which indicates that it might have been
a move to encourage e-commerce.
But it might also be that once consumer liability is limited to $50, the
marketing benefits to the network of going from $50 liability to zero
liability for nonnegligent consumers outweigh the fraud losses. Given the
costs of pursuing the last $50 of liability, issuers really do not give up
anything by going to zero liability, and they gain a significant marketing
benefit. The zero liability policies are advertised in a way that implies that
they are strict liability regimes, with the fact that they are highly
discretionary negligence regimes hidden in vaguely worded fine print.
Thus, consumers might well assume that they have less liability than they
do under the zero liability policies. Moreover, the cost of disputing up to
$50 with consumers might simply not be worthwhile for issuers.
The real question is whether networks would adopt zero liability
policies if by statute consumers were liable for $100 or $500 or $1,000? We
don’t know, but it cautions against assuming that the $50 liability limit has
been toothless or that zero liability would be the policy the networks would
generally adopt.194
2. Monetary Deductibles, Copayments, and Contributory
Negligence
The mandatory liability caps are part of a system that includes notable
moral hazard mitigants. The federal consumer liability limitations are a type
of strict liability regime for card fraud. As Samuel Rea has noted, “[s]trict
liability without contributory negligence is essentially mandatory
insurance.”195 A standard insurance move to reduce moral hazard is to
require deductibles and copayments. The $50 liability cap on credit cards

193. Letter from Russel W. Schrader, Visa U.S.A., to Fed. Trade Comm’n (Sept. 15, 2000),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/idtheft/comments/schraderrussellw.pdf (discussing
Visa’s zero liability policy that took effect on April 4, 2000); Selco Visa Cards—Zero Liability,
SELCO, https://www.selco.org/creditcards/zero.liability.asp (last visited Sept. 23, 2010); Eden
Jaeger, Should You Be Afraid of Your Debit Card?, FINANCE & FAT (Jan. 4, 2008),
http://www.financeandfat.com/archives/should-you-be-afraid-of-your-debit-card.
194. One factor that might push for some sort of liability limiting policy even in the absence of
the federal caps is the recognition that consumer loss aversion is a major obstacle to increasing the
use of payment cards. Would consumers have adopted payment cards on as wide of a scale as they
have without the federal liability caps? We cannot be sure, but it seems likely that the liability
caps at least contributed to greater consumer adoption of payment cards, and by further reducing
the caps the card networks aimed to eliminate the residual loss aversion.
195. Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Comments on Epstein, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 671, 672 (1985); see also
Gillette, supra note 8, at 201 (discussing liability cap as insurance).
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can thus be seen as equivalent to a $50 deductible on a mandatory federal
insurance policy.196
For debit cards, federal law creates a strict liability regime with a
peculiar kind of contributory negligence. The contributory negligence under
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and Reg E is only for losses incurred
after the loss or theft of the card due to failure to promptly report the loss or
theft; it does not apply to pre-loss or pre-theft behavior.197 In other words,
the contributory negligence component of consumer liability for
unauthorized debit card transactions only goes to the magnitude of the loss
due to unauthorized use, not the actions that caused the loss in the first
place. The result is that it does not incentivize consumers to take
precautions to prevent loss or theft. This means that in terms of fraud losses,
there is primarily a strict liability regime for debit cards too, and with a $50
deductible.
3. Non-Pecuniary Costs
In addition to the monetary deductible, there can also be considerable
non-pecuniary harms to consumers from unauthorized card usage. It is not
merely “the major inconvenience of the disruption of service,”198 or having
to get the charges reversed, but also things like having to monitor credit
reports, close other accounts, etc.199 These additional, non-pecuniary costs
are essentially copayments. Thus, built into the federal liability limitation
are two standard responses to moral hazard problems—deductibles and
copayments.
4. Limited Consumer Ability to Prevent Fraud
Imposing liability on consumers for unauthorized transactions makes
little sense if that liability does not alter consumer behavior. Some
unauthorized transactions are due to consumer negligence, but others are
not. We lack an empirical sense of the role cardholder negligence plays in
unauthorized transactions. Clearly there are numerous fraud possibilities
even when a consumer acts responsibly. Consider a simple case where a
196. One can, of course, argue whether that is a sufficiently large deductible to ensure optimal
care, not least given that the $50 liability limit is not inflation adjusted and has remained constant
for decades.
197. See 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(2) (2010).
Negligence by the consumer cannot be used as the basis for imposing greater liability
than is permissible under Regulation E. Thus, consumer behavior that may constitute
negligence under state law, such as writing the PIN on a debit card or on a piece of
paper kept with the card, does not affect the consumer’s liability for unauthorized
transfers.
Id. § 205, at Supplement I to Part 205, Official Staff Interpretations, ¶6(b) (2).
198. Epstein & Brown, supra note 9, at 219.
199. See Mann, Making Sense of Payments, supra note 8, at 638.
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consumer is robbed and the card is used for a transaction by the thief before
the consumer can report its loss. What justification is there for consumer
liability then? More typically, card data is not stolen directly from the
consumer, but from a merchant or a financial institution. Again, the
justification for consumer liability is missing in such cases; the consumer
has no ability to control merchant or financial institution data security
measures.
Instead, the case for consumer liability seems limited to situations in
which a consumer fails to take reasonable care of his or her physical card,
such as writing a PIN number on a debit card and then leaving a debit card
in a location where it could be pilfered by a domestic employee. It seems
unlikely that such situations account for a significant portion of payment
card fraud.
Consider, then, an intermediate situation, in which the cardholder
leaves his card out long enough for someone to copy down the card digits.
Should the cardholder be liable in such a situation? Or should the liability
be better placed on the card issuer that issued an account access device that
is so easily compromised?
5. Consumer Knowledge of Liability Rules and Concerns About
Issuer Compliance
In addition, as Professor Ronald Mann has noted, consumers may not
know of the liability limitation.200 It is doubtful, for example, that most
consumers are aware of the contributory negligence rules for debit card
liability. Similarly, Mann notes that even informed consumers might doubt
whether financial institutions would comply with the law.201 If a financial
institution does not comply with the liability rules in the case of a debit
transaction, the consumer simply loses his or her money. In the case of a
credit transaction, the consumer might be able to avoid the monetary loss,
but risks the loss of a credit line, a damaged credit report, and debt
collection harassment. While the consumer could litigate the issue, in many
cases, the cost of litigating would vastly outweigh the harm to the
consumer.202
When consumers are unaware of the liability limitation, moral hazard
simply will not exist, and if they are concerned about legal compliance,
then moral hazard must be discounted. All of these factors—deductibles,
copayments, contributory negligence, lack of knowledge about the law, and
doubts about compliance with the law—suggest that moral hazard concerns

200. Id.; see also Cooter & Rubin, supra note 8, at 75 (“Liability, however, is a useful
incentive, whether for precaution or innovation, only to the extent that behavior responds to it; a
particular assignment of liability that does not influence behavior has no economic justification.”).
201. Mann, Making Sense of Payments, supra note 8, at 638.
202. See Cooter & Rubin, supra note 8, at 81.
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about the federal liability limitation are overblown, and that consumers
have a reasonably strong incentive to protect their cards and card data.
Finally, while the zero liability policy could create a moral hazard if the
counterweights of deductibles and copayments were insufficient, that moral
hazard must be weighed against the alternative. We have to consider the
situation that would obtain in the absence of the zero liability policy or $50
federal liability cap. What would consumer liability look like? Would it
reflect a Coasean bargain between consumers and card issuer? It is hard to
believe that it would because of the tremendous information asymmetries
between card issuers and consumers.203
6. Adverse Selection as Justification for Mandatory Liability
Rules
Information asymmetries raise the possibility of adverse selection
problems, which are a standard justification for mandatory insurance
regimes like the federal consumer liability limitations. (An analogous
consumer liability situation is state law mandating nonrecourse
mortgages.204) The problem of adverse selection arises because of a
tendency of low-risk individuals to drop out of insurance pools when
insurers cannot distinguish between high- and low-risk individuals.205
Insurers must charge a blended price, which is too high for the low-risk
individuals. The result is that insurance pools are then comprised of higher
risk individuals, so insurers charge higher premiums, which further
exacerbates the adverse selection by driving out the lower-risk individuals
remaining in the pool. The result can be a socially suboptimal level of
insurance.
A standard response to adverse selection is to mandate insurance, so as
to force both low-risk and high-risk individuals into the same risk pool.206
In the case of payment card fraud, there is good reason to encourage
mandatory insurance. There is a possibility of suboptimal insurance due to
consumers’ difficulty in gauging both the likelihood and magnitude of
payment card fraud loss because neither relates solely to their behavior. To
the extent that consumers overestimate the risks, they may well opt-out of
using payment cards altogether. Liability limitations are a market
confidence building measure.

203. See id. at 68–70 (discussing the problems of information asymmetries in payment markets,
wherein financial institutions typically have superior information to consumers).
204. I am indebted to Professor Ron Harris of Tel Aviv University School of Law for this
insight, which comes from his work-in-progress on nonrecourse mortgages.
205. Tom Baker, Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk
Classification, in RISK AND MORALITY, RICHARD V. ERICSON & AARON DOYLE, EDS. 258, 259,
261 (2003). But see Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated
Threat, 113 YALE L.J. 1223 (2004).
206. See Rea, supra note 195, at 673.
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7. Contractual Frictions: Information Asymmetries, Bargaining
Costs, Bundled Pricing, Hyperbolic Discounting, and Price
Salience
Adverse selection is driven by one set of information asymmetries—
that consumers know more about their own riskiness than card issuers.
Another set of information asymmetries—that issuers know more about the
terms of cardholder agreements than consumers—combines with
asymmetric negotiation costs to create further frictions that impede efficient
Coasean bargaining. As Professors Cooter and Rubin have noted:
[T]he cost of negotiating the loss allocation provisions of a
consumer deposit agreement typically exceeds the potential benefit.
Shopping for alternative sets of fixed term contracts—a more
realistic scenario than bargaining for specific terms—eliminates
these negotiation costs, but replaces them with search costs.
Moreover, asymmetric information limits the effectiveness of
consumer shopping. Consumers are unlikely to think about the
liability terms of a contract when opening an account, and those that
do, find their curiosity rewarded with the incomprehensible
legalisms of form contracts and statute books. Even if they knew
what the terms meant, consumers generally would not know how to
value differences in these terms.207
A further reason to be skeptical that private bargaining would produce
optimal consumer liability rules is that liability for unauthorized
transactions is only one term among many in cardholder agreements.208 If
one takes Epstein and Brown’s subscription to a Coasean universe
seriously, this observation should be heartening. It should not matter what
the fraud liability rule is because the parties can simply reallocate if that is
efficient.209 Liability for unauthorized use is merely one component of
payment card pricing. Thus, the federal liability cap does not restrict total
pricing of payment cards. It only affects one way of expressing that price.
Accordingly, parties can effectively reallocate the total price through other
price components of payment cards. In the Coasean world, whether the
price of using a payment card is allocated via liability rules or annual fees
or interchange fees should not matter if there is the same level of
competition on each and every price term. In other words, if Epstein and
Brown are correct about the market, the federal liability cap does not create
a troublesome distortion.

207. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 8, at 68–69.
208. Oren Bar-Gill, Bundling and Consumer Misperception, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 33, 33–35
(2006).
209. See generally Coase, supra note 15.
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In reality, however, not all price terms for payment cards are equal and
fully interchangeable. There is more vigorous competition on some price
terms than others, in part due to their salience to consumers. When
confronted with a multi-term contract, consumers may give undue emphasis
to terms that are particularly salient either because of the manner in which
the information is presented to the consumer or because of hyperbolic
discounting of contingent events.210 This means that there is a discounting
that occurs in the trade-off between price terms, so the reallocation of costs
among price terms might not be neutral in terms of total cost. If payment
card pricing is forced by regulation from less salient to more salient price
terms, there will be more vigorous price competition, which will push down
the total cost of using a payment card.
This suggests that in the absence of regulation, a profit-maximizing
firm will place as much of the price as possible on less salient terms and
will max out on consumers’ price elasticity on less salient terms before
letting pricing spill over to more salient terms. Regulation, then, does not
necessarily result in a one-for-one substitution of price terms, but can result
in an overall reduction in price (and profit margin).
The contingent nature of liability for unauthorized card usage, as well
as the potential absence of a clear monetary price term if either a consumer
negligence standard or strict consumer liability were to apply, means that
fraud liability is unlikely to be a salient term for consumers.211 In the
context of these bundled contracts, there might not be optimal pricing of
fraud terms, even if there were vigorous competition among issuers for
consumers. Thus, the federal liability cap might actually have
precompetitive effects by forcing payment card issuers to shift pricing away
from a less salient term like liability for unauthorized use and to more
salient price points like annual fees or interest rates.
The federal statutory limitations on consumer liability may not be
optimal (not least because the $50 deductible is not inflation indexed, so the
real potential pecuniary liability is constantly decreasing), but it is far from
clear that they result in an inferior outcome than private-ordering. The
regulatory outcome may not be Kaldor-Hicks optimal, but it might increase
consumer surplus by encouraging more vigorous price competition.
8. Relative Ability to Bear Losses
A final argument for the federal liability cap is distributional, or as
Cooter and Rubin refer to it, the “loss spreading principle”.212 Once there
210. See, e.g., Els C. M. van Schie & Joop van der Pligt, Influencing Risk Preference in
Decision Making: The Effects of Framing and Salience, 63 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 264 (1995).
211. Cooter & Rubin, supra note 8, at 70 (“Consumer payment contracts contain elements other
than loss allocation terms, but market failure is most likely to involve these technical, obscure
elements of the contract, rather than the comprehensible and salient ones.”).
212. Id. at 70–73.

2010]

Private Disordering?

47

are losses in the system, they must be allocated somewhere, and placing
losses on parties in accordance with their ability to absorb losses presents a
potential principle for loss allocation. The loss spreading principle stands in
some tension with a least cost avoider principle, as it is based on ability to
absorb, rather than prevent, losses.
Cooter and Rubin argue that risk should be assigned to the party that
can achieve risk-neutrality—that is having equal valuation of a risk of a loss
and the average value of that loss—at the lowest cost.213 As Cooter and
Rubin explain, risk neutrality is dependent upon the relative size of the loss
to a party’s assets and the party’s ability to spread the loss.214 Both factors
point to financial institutions and merchants being able to achieve risk
neutrality more cheaply than consumers.
Because consumers’ resources are generally more limited than financial
institutions’ or merchants’, consumers are less well suited to bear unlimited
liability from the unauthorized use of a payment card than a financial
institution or a merchant. Liability for $100,000 in unauthorized charges
would be devastating to most households’ finances in a way that it would
not be for a financial institution or certainly a large merchant. This makes
consumers more risk averse than financial institutions or merchants.
Consumers also have less ability to spread losses than financial
institutions or merchants. For a consumer, the unauthorized use of a
payment card is a fairly remote risk, but with potentially high costs. These
costs will likely be borne entirely by the consumer; they cannot easily be
passed on to other parties.215 For a financial institution or a merchant, fraud
is a regular occurrence, and its costs can be amortized over a large base of
transactions. Moreover, because financial institutions and merchants have
superior information about their risks from payment card fraud relative to
consumers, they are more likely to optimally insure against it.216
Consumers’ more limited ability to absorb losses than other payment card
network participants is an additional argument for limiting their liability by
statute.
CONCLUSION
Payment card networks, if left to their own devices, are as likely to
produce private disorder, as efficient private order. Regulatory attention has
focused on the explicit price points in payments—interchange fees—but the
latent price point of fraud liability allocation is equally important.
Optimizing fraud liability allocation necessitates recognition of the co213. Id. at 71.
214. Id.
215. Consumers are unlikely to insure against losses because the risk is difficult to estimate,
which results in known bargaining costs outweighing the questionable benefit of the insurance. Id.
at 72.
216. Id. at 72-73.
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optetive nature of payment card networks. Some issues are best approached
through encouraging fairer and more adequate representation of all parties
in interest in coordination among payment card networks. Other issues are
best approached through encouraging more vigorous competition. We
should not assume that the invisible hand will guide the payment card
industry to the optimal outcome; but with limited regulatory corrections,
payments card network liability rules can come closer to achieving a
Coasean paradise, and making payments—the ultimate unavoidable
transaction cost—more efficient, thereby reducing transaction costs
throughout the rest of the economy.

